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SETTLING IN THE SHADOW OF SEX: GENDER BIAS IN

MARITAL ASSET DIVISION
Jennifer Bennett Shinallt

Divorce has a long history of economically disempowering women. From the
time of coverture to the era of modern divorce reform, women have been persistently
disadvantaged by divorce relative to men. Family law scholars have long attributed
this disadvantage to the continued prevalence of traditionalgender roles and the
failure of current marital asset division laws to account adequately for this
prevalence. In spite of the progress made by the women's movement over the past
half-century, married, heterosexual women endure as the primary caretaker in the
majority of households, and married, heterosexual men endure as the primary
breadwinners. Undoubtedly, women who have made career sacrifices during a
marriageface a harsh economic reality when the marriage breaks down. But this
Article is the first to question whether the persistence of traditionalgender roles is
solely responsiblefor the gender imbalances in economic securityfollowing a divorce.
Instead, this Article posits that gender bias against women-bias that is completely
separatefrom women's caretakingor breadwinning status-also harms women in
divorce proceedings. This gender bias may be harbored by judges, mediators, lawyers,
and even litigants themselves.

t Associate Professor of Law, Vanderbilt Law School, 131 21st Avenue South, Nashville,
TN 37203, jennifer.shinall@vanderbilt.edu, (615) 343-9622. For helpful feedback throughout
the course of this project, the author extends a special thanks to Nancy King, Owen Jones, Ellen
Clayton, Beverly Moran, Brian Fitzpatrick, Joni Hersch, W. Kip Viscusi, Kathryn Anderson,
Andrew Keane Woods, Brian Frye, Christopher Bradley, participants in the Conference on
Empirical Legal Studies in Europe, and participants in faculty law and economics workshops at
Vanderbilt University, the University of Kentucky, the University of Toronto, the University of
Texas, the University of Toronto, and Georgetown University. The author also wishes to
acknowledge Hannah Frank for her excellent research assistance.
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To test this theory, the Article utilizes an experimental vignette study, fielded
on 3,022 subjects. Subjects were randomly assigned to view one of several highly
similar scenarios where a couple is divorcing after a long-term marriage,and asked
to divide marital assets between them. In half of the scenarios, the male spouse was
the sole breadwinner and the female spouse was the principal caretaker, consistent
with traditionalgender roles. But in the other half of the scenarios, the situation was
reversed, with the female as the sole breadwinner and the male as the primary
caretaker. Comparingresults across subjects reveals that subjects consistentlyfavored
the male spouse over the similarly situatedfemale spouse. On average, both male and
female subjects assigned a greater share of the marital assets to the male breadwinner
than to the female breadwinner. Male and female subjects also assigned a greater
share of the marital assets to the male caretaker than to the female caretaker. The
results are consistent with gender bias, as subjects penalize the female spouse in both
the stereotypic (male-breadwinner/female-caretaker)and the nonstereotypic (femalebreadwinner/male-caretaker)scenarios. Given these sustained preferences for the
male spouse in the divorce setting, the Article concludes by considering empathy
induction, auditing,and legal presumption reforms to counter the effects of bias in
divorce settlements and to assist women, at last, in gaining equivalent economic
standingwith men after a divorce.
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INTRODUCTION

Marriage has come a long way, particularly in the past half-century.
Many long-term couples no longer default to marriage as the taboos
associated with cohabitation and children outside of marriage decline.1
Same-sex marriage, once a thing of fantasy, is now a constitutionally
protected right.2 Even for more traditional, heterosexual married
couples with children, power dynamics may have shifted3 as an
increasing number of women work outside the home,4 and an
increasing number of men undertake childcare responsibilities.5
1 See, e.g., The Decline of Marriage and Rise of New Families, PEW RES. CTR. (Nov. 18,
2010), http://www.pewsocialtrends.org/2010/11/18/the-decline-of-marriage-and-rise-of-newfamilies [https://perma.cc/8T29-WUPW] (documenting a decline in marriage rates, a rise in
cohabitation rates, and a rise in the share of children born to unmarried mothers since 1960).
2 See Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2598-99 (2015) (holding that the right to
marry is a fundamental right inherent in liberty that may not be deprived by the state).
3 For a discussion of the economic theory of the family and how family power dynamics
may shift with spousal economic power, see MARRIAGE AND THE ECONOMY: THEORY AND
EVIDENCE FROM ADVANCED INDUSTRIAL SOCIETIES (Shoshana A. Grossbard-Shechtman ed.,
2003); see also Karen D. Pyke, Women's Employment as a Gift or Burden? MaritalPower Across
Marriage, Divorce, and Remarriage, 8 GENDER & SOC'Y 73 (1994) (exploring through survey
evidence how women's power shifts across marriages with rising and falling economic power).
4 See, e.g., MITRA TOOSSI & TERESA L. MORISI, U.S. BUREAU LABOR STATISTICS, WOMEN IN
THE WORKFORCE BEFORE, DURING, AND AFTER THE GREAT RECESSION (2017), https://
www.bls.gov/spodight/2017/women- in-the-workforce-before-during-and-after- the-greatrecession/pdf/women- in-the-workforce-before-during- and-after-the-great-recession.pdf

1860

CARDOZO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 40:1857

So too has divorce, the counterpart of marriage, come a long way in
the past half-century. Approximately fifty years ago, a reform movement
began sweeping the country to make divorces easier to obtain.6 No
longer would spouses be required to prove a specific reason or party at
fault for the marriage's breakdown. Instead, a faultless breakdown due
7
to irreconcilable differences would be enough to end a marriage. On
the heels of this revolutionary reform, divorce rates rose precipitously so
that, today, more than one in four U.S. adults have ever been divorced.8
Although so much about divorce has changed over the past few
decades, one aspect of divorce has remained quite consistent over time:
women's economic disadvantage.9 Besides simplifying the divorce
process, divorce reform introduced significant changes to how marital
assets were divided, so that assets would thenceforth be divided

[https://perma.cc/DA8C-NFUAI ("A major factor that contributed to the growth of the U.S.
labor force in the second half of the twentieth century was the remarkable increase in the labor
force participation rate of women."); Francine D. Blau & Anne E. Winkler, Women, Work, and
Family (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 23644, 2017) (reviewing positive
long-term trends of mothers' participation rate in the labor force). But see Francine D. Blau &
Lawrence M. Kahn, Female Labor Supply: Why is the U.S. FallingBehind?, 103 AM. ECON. REV.
251, 253-55 (2013) (arguing that the lack of "family-friendly" work policies in the U.S. has led
to a relative decline in labor force participation by women).
5 See Kim Parker & Gretchen Livingston, 7 Facts About American Dads, PEW RES. CTR.
(June 13, 2018), http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2018/06/13/fathers-day-facts [https://
perma.cc/3B4T-H4TX] ("Today, fathers who live with their children are taking a more active
role in caring for them and helping out around the house."). But see Claire Cain Miller, Men Do
More at Home, but Not as Much as They Think, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 12, 2015), https://
www.nytimes.com/2015/11/12/upshot/men-do-more-at-home-but-not-as-much-as-they-thinkthey-do.html?_r=0 [https://perma.cc/6U6E-9YYU] ("[Men] say they do as much housework
and child care as their wives-even though data show that they don't."); Brigid Schulte, Once
the Baby Comes, Moms Do More, Dads Do Less Around the House, WASH. POST (May 7, 2015),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/parenting/wp/2015/05/07/once-the-baby-comes[https://perma.cc/
moms- do-more-dads-do-less-around-the-house/?utm_term=.fdO2df2d7a60
of childcare and
terms
in
more
do
mothers
that
evidence
the
6HXS-WZT2] (discussing
housework).
6 See infra Section l.A.
7 See id.

8 See Lydia Saad, Divorce Doesn't Last, GALLUP NEWS (Mar. 30, 2004), http://news.
gallup.com/poll/11161/divorce-doesnt-lasLaspx [https://perma.cc/6YNM-A932] (reporting that
27 percent of Americans have ever been divorced).
9 See infra Section L.A.
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equitablylo-a move intended in part to prevent husbands from taking
everything and leaving their wives destitute." Yet women as a whole
continue to see their finances decline after divorce. In fact, a recent
study estimated that women's incomes decline after divorce between
12% to 30%, while men's incomes increase between 31% to 36%.12
Meanwhile, women's post-divorce poverty rate remains almost three
times the post-divorce poverty rate of men.13
Family law scholars have long recognized this gender gap in
economic outcomes after divorce, but they have largely blamed the
continued popular embrace of traditional gender roles and the current
14
law's inability to account for it.
Specifically, family law scholars have
assumed that the problem stems from the inability of marital asset
division law to value women's contributions to the home, as well as its
failure to recognize that women persist as the primary caretaker in most
households. 15
Such forces undoubtedly account for some of the persistence in
unequal gender outcomes after divorce.16 Nonetheless, one danger of
solely relying on these gender-role-based explanations is that they make
it easy for critics to blame the divorce disparity on women making
different economic choices than men. 17 Another danger of solely relying
10Marital assets are divided equitably in forty-seven states. See Joni Hersch & Jennifer
Bennett Shinall, Division of Marital Assets in High Asset Divorces, App. Table 1 (unpublished
working
paper),
https://papers.ssrn.comlsol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=3353484
[https://perma.cc/KW6M-ENW3].
11 See id.
12 Stephen P. Jenkins, Marital Splits and Income Changes over the Longer Term (Inst. for
Soc. & Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 2008-07, 2008), https://www.iser.essex.ac.uk/files/
iser working-papers/2008-07.pdf [https://perma.cc/B3EW-5JF2]; see also Darlena Cunha, The
Divorce Gap, ATLANTIC (Apr. 28, 2016), https://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2016/
04/the-divorce-gap/480333 [https://perma.cc/KXD7-WSBY] (discussing the financial burdens

of divorce for women).
13 Jenkins, supra note 12, at 16-17.
14 See infra Section I.B.
15 See id.
16 See Jenkins, supra note 12, at 19-20 (arguing that women's relative disadvantage after
divorce has improved over time because more women are now in the labor market, although
admitting that the disadvantage still exists).
17 Conservative voices are often quick to dismiss gender-based economic disparities as a
product of women making different choices than men. See, e.g., Walter Olson, Gender Pay Gap:
When You've Lost Slate....
CATO INST. (Jan. 30, 2014, 1:49 PM), https://www.cato.org/blog/
gender-pay-gap -when-youve-lost-slate [https://perma.cc/SV54-V23E] ("Most, if not all, of the
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on these gender-role-based explanations is that it precludes other
possible explanations. And there is reason to believe that another
explanation exists-gender bias.
Research on implicit and explicit bias has abounded in the legal
scholarship of the past two decades, yet remains noticeably absent from
the family law literature.18 Despite well-known disparities in attitudes
towards minorities and women19-and despite the well-known
disparities in divorce outcomes by gender-scholars have yet to
consider whether gender bias by decision-makers, lawyers, and litigants
may be responsible for at least some of the post-divorce gap in men's
and women's finances. Throughout this Article, I use the term gender
bias to signify a preference towards individuals of one gender that is
independent of their economic choices in the labor market.
This Article fills the gap within the family law literature by
assessing the effects of both household roles and gender bias in
determining marital asset split. Using an experimental vignette study,
the Article evaluates whether decision-makers display equal treatment
of divorcing male and female spouses, and whether decision-makers'
treatment varies with the prior economic contributions of each spouse.
Evaluating the results across subjects reveals a consistent preference for
the male spouse in dividing marital assets-a result consistent with
gender bias. Decision-makers award a smaller percentage of assets to the
woman, relative to a similarly situated man, regardless of the woman's
prior economic contributions to the household. The Article thus
advocates for reforms targeted at legal actors and legal decision-makers
to counteract the effects of gender bias in divorce settlements.
In making this argument, the Article proceeds as follows: in Part I,
I briefly review the divorce reform movement, its failure to align men's
and women's outcomes, and prior scholarly explanations for its failure. I

gap melts away once you factor in variables such as hours worked, choice of occupation, and
midcareer family interruption, among others."). But see Emily Crockett, The Gender Wage Gap
Isn't About Women's Choices. It's About How We Value Their Work, VOX (Aug 23, 2016, 12:40
2
https://www.vox.com/2016/4/1 /11410270/equal-pay-day-2016-womens-choices-wagePM),
gap [https://perma.cc/VVY8-GJ4L] ("IT]hose choices are often tied to things like gender
stereotypes, social pressure, and how well certain industries accommodate family
responsibilities.").
18 See infra Section I.C.
19 See id.

2019]

SETTLING IN THE SHADOW OFSEX

1863

further look beyond family law scholarship to consider the possible role
of gender bias in divorce reform's failure. In Part II, I introduce the
experiment and discuss the results. Part III suggests three reforms to
counteract the role of gender bias in divorce-instituting empathyinduction reforms for decision-makers, auditing decision-maker
outcomes, and, most importantly, introducing a legal presumption of
equal division.
I.

UNEQUAL OUTCOMES: UNDERSTANDING WOMEN'S DISADVANTAGE IN

DIVORCE

For decades, scholars have lamented the economic harms divorce
brings upon women but not upon men. Women's relative disadvantages
after divorce are longstanding, extending from times when married
women were prohibited from owning property. 20 The movement to
reform divorce laws in the 1960s and 1970s was intended in part to
ameliorate this disadvantage, but as reviewed in Section I.A, the
movement's actual effect has been questionable. After considering these
reformed divorce laws, which remain in place today, Sections I.B and
I.C consider possible explanations for the persistence of women's postdivorce economic disadvantages decades after divorce reform.
A.

The Disappointmentof EquitableDivision

Coverture has long been formally abolished,21 yet some vestiges of
this doctrine lingered within state laws until just a few decades ago. 22

See infra Section I.A.
Coverture is the common law doctrine by which women's rights and obligations were
subsumed by their husbands upon marriage. Traditionally, this legal doctrine prevented
married women from being sued, forming contracts, or owning property. The advent of state
married women's property acts in the mid-nineteenth century began the gradual chipping away
of the doctrine, which would take more than a century to disappear completely. See Reva B.
Siegel, The Modernizationof MaritalStatus Law: Adjudicating Wives' Rights to Earnings, 18601930, 82 GEO. L.J. 2127, 2127-32 (1995).
22 See, e.g., Siegel, supra note 21, at 2132-49 (giving an account of the slow demise of the
coverture doctrine with respect to women's entitlement to their earnings); see also Sally F.
Goldfarb, Marital Partnership and the Case for Permanent Alimony, 27 J. FAM. L. 351, 354
(1989) ("In sharp contrast to Blackstone's famous common law formulation that.., the
20
21
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Indeed, one of the final remnants of the doctrine that remained
concerned the distribution of marital assets upon divorce. Only half a
century ago, states persisted in dividing assets according to the
property-title owner at the time of divorce.23 This traditional regime, not
surprisingly, favored husbands over wives, as men were more likely than
women to be the household's primary or sole earner (and continue to be
so even today).24 Men, as a result, held the title to most, if not all, of the
marital property. The natural consequence of the traditional propertytitle holder regime, as Elizabeth Scott has noted, was for the costs of
divorce to "[fall] disproportionately on wives, who had far more to lose
than did husbands if the marriage failed"25 For victims of this regime,
the only remedy available in many jurisdictions was the award of

woman's legal existence is merged into the man's at marriage, the modern view is that marriage
is a partnership of equals. All common law states now.. . recogniz[e] that both spouses have
been partners in acquiring property during the marriage regardless of which spouse holds
title."). Cf.Joan Williams, Is Coverture Dead? Beyond a New Theory of Alimony, 82 GEO.L.J.
2227, 2230 (1994) ("The question that faces modern courts is whether to preserve coverture's
allocation [of earnings upon divorce] or to change it.").
23 See Herma Hill Kay, Equality and Difference: A Perspective on No-Fault Divorce and Its
Aftermath, 56 U. CIN. L. REV. 1, 8 & n.25 (1987) (noting that a 1969 review of state divorce laws
"shows seventeen common law states and the District of Columbia as not authorizing,
prohibiting, or restricting property distribution on divorce, and twenty-five common law states
as allowing such distribution under some circumstances"); see also Goldfarb, supra note 22, at
353 ("Under English law and in the early years of common law development in this country, the
wife automatically became financially dependent on the husband at the time of marriage, and
the husband automatically gained control of his wife's property and income-together with the
obligation to support her.").
24 Fifty years ago, the women's labor force participation rate was less than half the men's
rate, with particularly low rates for married women. See Claudia Goldin, The Quiet Revolution
that Transformed Women's Employment, Education, and Family, 96 AM. ECON. REV. 1, 4
(2006). Moreover, even the women who chose to work fifty years ago earned far less than did
men. In the 1960s, the median female worker earned less than 60% of what the median male
worker earned. Today, that ratio has improved (although a gender gap persists), so that the
median female worker earns approximately 75% of what the median male worker earns. See
Casey B. Mulligan & Yona Rubinstein, Selection, Investment, and Women's Relative Wages over
Time, 123 Q.J. ECON. 1061, 1063 (2008). Today, the women's labor force participation rate
(approximately 60%) still remains less than the men's rate (approximately 70%). See U.S.
BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, REPORT 1049, WOMEN IN THE LABOR FORCE: A DATABOOK 1-2

(2014), https://www.bls.gov/cps/wlf-databook-2013.pdf [https://perma.cc/26JB-KWKV].
25 Elizabeth S. Scott, Social Norms and the Legal Regulation of Marriage, 86 VA. L. REV.
1901, 1934-35 (2000); see also id. at 1963.
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alimony26 yet such awards often proved insufficient and went unpaid.27
Consequently, twentieth-century divorce law advocates and reformers
decried the traditional property-title-holder division regime as a
mechanism for constraining and impoverishing women. 28
Actual reform to U.S. divorce laws did not begin, however, until
1969. In that year, the pioneering state in the divorce reform movement,
California, passed its Family Law Act, the first no-fault-based divorce
regime in the country.29 Although attribution of fault and property
division may, on their face, seem to have little to do with each other, in
fact they were both key elements in the same comprehensive divorce
reform movement often described by commentators as the no-fault
divorce revolution.30 Besides its namesake reform, which eliminated the
requirement that one spouse take the blame for the breakdown of the
marriage in the event of divorce,31 this revolution encompassed reforms

26 Alimony provides a periodic support award to the economically disadvantaged spouse
after divorce; traditionally, alimony terminates upon death or remarriage of the disadvantaged
spouse. For perspectives on alimony awards and the development of U.S. divorce laws, see
LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 181-84, 434-40 (1973); LYNNE
C.
HALEM, DIVORCE REFORM: CHANGING LEGAL AND SOCIAL PERSPECTIVES (1980).

27 Marsha Garrison, Good Intentions Gone Awry: The Impact of New York's Equitable
DistributionLaw on Divorce Outcomes, 57 BROOK. L. REV. 621, 627 (1991) (noting that alimony
"often failed to do economic justice.... Sometimes, for example, a husband
was simply unable
to pay alimony that adequately compensated a wife for property she had brought into the
marriage").
28 See, e.g., Garrison, supra note 27, at 629-30 ("The reasons reformers gave for favoring
property division over alimony were numerous. First of all, they noted, alimony was seldom
awarded and even more infrequently paid."); Max Rheinstein, Division of Marital Property, 12
WILLAMETTE L.J. 413, 424 (1975) ("[T]he separate ownership of his or her respective assets
meant that on divorce both spouses would walk away with whatever each happened to own. In
the case of a housewife, this easily meant nothing. If she needed support, she would be given a
claim for alimony against the husband. This claim would be precarious, if enforceable at all, and
it might be forfeited if she was guilty of adultery or other serious marital misconduct.").
29 See Kay, supra note 23, at 1.
30 See, e.g., HERBERT JACOB, SILENT REVOLUTION: THE TRANSFORMATION OF DIVORCE LAW
IN THE UNITED STATES
UNEXPECTED

SOCIAL

(1988);

AND

LENORE J. WEITZMAN,

ECONOMIC

CONSEQUENCES

THE DIVORCE REVOLUTION:
FOR

WOMEN

THE

AND CHILDREN

IN

AMERICA (1985).

31 No-fault divorce introduced the standard of "irreconcilable differences[] which have
caused the irremediable breakdown of the marriage" as grounds for divorce. See CAL. CIV.
CODE § 4508 (West 2019).
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in property division, child custody,32 and gender- and sexuality-based
presumptions. 33 With respect to property division, the frontrunning34
California legislation settled on a system of equal division of assets.
Even though subsequent reforms by other states would mimic the
California legislation in many respects, the majority of states would
instead settle on an alternative property division regime: equitable
35
division of assets.
The proliferation of the equitable division standard is largely due to
the promulgation of the Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act (UMDA) by
36
the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws. An
ongoing project since the 1960s, the final version of the UMDA, issued
7
in 1973, endorsed the equitable division standard According to one of
32 The 1969 California Family Law Act eliminated the general presumption that mothers
were the best custodians of children (except, in the statute's words, during a child's "tender
years"). See Kay, supra note 23, at 41-43. Rather, it adopted a best interests of the child
standard for custody determinations. See id. at 41. Ten years later, another piece of reform
legislation in California would favor the joint custody model. See Herma Hill Kay, An Appraisal
of California'sNo-Fault Divorce Law, 75 CALIF. L. REV. 291, 308 (1987).
33 See Kay, supra note 23, at 41-43 (describing the elimination of California's custody
presumption in favor of the female parent); Kay, supra note 32, at 296 ("Although California
courts did not hold gay parents unfit as custodians merely because of their sexual orientation,
little more was required to sustain an award of custody to the other parent based on the best

interests of the child.").
34 See CAL. CIV. CODE § 4800(b)(1)-(2) (West 2019).

Equal versus equitable division of assets was the subject of much debate at the time of the
divorce revolution, with otherwise similar interest groups taking opposite sides. See, e.g., Doris
Jonas Freed & Henry H. Foster, Jr., Divorce in the Fifty States: An Overview, 14 FAM. L.Q. 229,
230 (1981) (reporting that the National Organization for Women backed equal division, in
contrast to other women's groups); Mary Ann Glendon, Family Law Reform in the 1980's, 44
A
LA. L. REV. 1553, 1555-57 (1984) (arguing against equitable division); Joan M. Krauskopf,
(1976)
176-77
165,
REV.
L.
MO.
41
Theory for "Just" Division of Marital Property in Missouri,
(arguing for equal division as a starting point for dividing assets); see also Kay, supra note 23, at
35

57 (describing the debates).
36 See Robert J. Levy, A Reminiscence About the Uniform Marriageand Divorce Act-And
Some Reflections About Its Critics and Its Policies, 1991 BYU L. REV. 43, 44 ("[T]he Uniform Act
has been identified as the policy vehicle for the rapid spread through the United States
of... 'equitable distribution of marital property'-the concept that marriage should be treated
as a partnership whose assets must be fairly distributed between the spousal partners at divorce
without

regard to

TRANSFORMATION

their

formal

ownership.");

see also MARY

ANN

GLENDON,

THE

OF FAMILY LAW: STATE, LAW, AND FAMILY IN THE UNITED STATES AND

WESTERN EUROPE 227-28 (1989).
37 UNIF. MARRIAGE & DIVORCE ACT § 307 (NAT'L CONFERENCE OF COMM'RS ON UNIF.
STATE LAWS 1973).
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the UMDA's reporters, the preference for equitable division arose from a
concern that "the legislation of equality [would result] in a worsened
position for women and, by extension, a worsened position for
children."38 This concern was particularly salient since the UMDA also
favored one-time division of marital property over ongoing alimony
awards as a principal means of dividing assets at the time of divorce.39
Under the UMDA, equitable division of assets requires that assets be
divided
without regard to marital misconduct, in just proportions after
considering all relevant factors including: (1) contribution of each
spouse to acquisition of the marital property, including contribution
of a spouse as homemaker; (2) the value of the property set apart to
each spouse; (3) duration of the marriage; and (4) economic
circumstances of each spouse when the division of property is to
become effective, including the desirability of awarding the family
home or the right to live therein for reasonable periods to the spouse
having custody of any children.40
While state-by-state legislation may have introduced some
variations in language, this UMDA definition of equitable division
remains the baseline standard in equitable division states. 41
Although the equitable division standard-like no-fault divorce
reform more generally-was supposed to improve economic conditions
for wives upon divorce,42 scholars began to decry the realities of new
divorce legislation almost immediately. The origins of this backlash

38 Levy, supra note 36, at 51 (alteration in original).
39 UNIF. MARRIAGE & DIVORCE ACT §§ 307, 308(a) (NAT'L CONFERENCE OF COMM'RS ON
UNIF. STATE LAWS 1973); see also Milton C. Regan, Jr., Spouses and Strangers: Divorce

Obligations and Property Rhetoric, 82 GEO. L.J. 2303, 2306 (1994) ("[T]he law has adopted a
model that has the effect of treating ex-spouses primarily as strangers. The emphasis has been
on a 'clean break' between the partners, effectuated by a one-time division of marital assets and
restrictions on ongoing financial obligations.").
40 UNIF. MARRIAGE & DIVORCE ACT § 307 (NAT'L CONFERENCE OF COMM'RS ON UNIF.
STATE LAWS 1973).

41 See Levy, supra note 36, at 44 ("[Tlhe Uniform Act has been identified as the policy
vehicle for the rapid spread through the United States of... 'equitable distribution of marital
property.').
42 See Garrison, supra note 27, at 623-24 ("[T]he rules governing alimony and property
division were also motivated by a desire to improve the position of divorced wives.").
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against divorce reform are often traced to a 1985 book by sociologist
43
Lenore J. Weitzman, The Divorce Revolution. After conducting an
extensive qualitative and quantitative case study of divorce outcomes in
California in the wake of its no-fault legislation, Weitzman concluded
that in the year following divorce, the standard of living for ex-husbands
increased by 42%, while the standard of living for ex-wives declined by
73%.44 The accuracy of Weitzman's figures have subsequently been
called into question,45 yet even revised figures assessing relative quality
46
of life after a no-fault divorce are dismal for women. Beyond
California, a few subsequent empirical studies have focused on no-fault
regimes in which assets are divided equitably between divorcing
47
spouses, as is the case in forty-seven states. These studies have
concluded that outcomes for women under equitable division regimes
have been particularly poor. 48 Because equitable division does not even
49
guarantee women equal division of marital assets, it may leave
divorcing women in a particularly vulnerable state when the
proceedings have concluded.50

43 WEITZMAN, supra note 30.
44 See id.

45 See, e.g., Richard R. Peterson, A Re-Evaluation of the Economic Consequences of Divorce,
61 AM. SOC. REV. 528, 528-36 (1996) (finding that, in the year after divorce, the standard of
living for ex-husbands increased by 10%, while the standard of living for ex-wives declined by
27%).
46 See id.
47 See Hersch & Shinall, supra note 10 (finding that individuals dividing a marital estate

"equitably" in a vignette study favored the husband, regardless of the wife's education level and
the level of marital assets).
48 See, e.g., Garrison, supra note 27, at 739 ("The [equitable] property distribution
provisions of the new statute thus failed to provide major benefits to divorced wives."); see also
MARTHA ALBERTSON FINEMAN, THE ILLUSION OF EQUALITY: THE RHETORIC AND REALITY OF

DIVORCE REFORM (1991).
49 See FINEMAN, supra note 48 (criticizing the emphasis of divorce reform legislation on
equalizing treatment, instead of outcomes).
50 Cf Cynthia Starnes, Divorce and the Displaced Homemaker: A Discourse on Playing with
Dolls, PartnershipBuyouts and Dissociation Under No-Fault, 60 U. CHI. L. REV. 67, 85 (1993)
("No-fault presumes that a one-time division of traditional property on divorce will equitably
settle the parties' rights and responsibilities. This presumption has proved to be wishful
thinking. The typical insubstantial amount of tangible marital assets, together with the
discretionary nature of the division of those assets, often make the division of property both
insignificant and unpredictable.").

2019]

SETTLING IN THE SHADOW OF SEX

1869

How vulnerable divorced wives remain under equitable division
regimes remains a source of debate. Some scholars have argued that
divorced women are economically worse off under equitable division
regimes than they were under traditional property-title-holder division
regimes.51 Others have pushed back against this assertion, asserting that
economic conditions of divorced women have improved, at least
somewhat, since the no-fault divorce revolution.52 From an empirical
standpoint, the difficulty in resolving this debate stems from an inability
to source reliable and representative data on divorces. Divorce cases are
generally subject to simple, non-extensive filing requirements,
particularly if they settle; the divorce cases in which more extensive
filings and judicial opinions are available are highly contested, and
arguably less representative, divorce cases.5 3 Such difficulties exist when
gathering data on even the most recent divorces; gathering data on prerevolution divorces poses the additional challenges associated with older
data.s4 Still, based on the limited empirical data that do exist, scholars
51 See, e.g., Mary Ziegler, An Incomplete Revolution: Feminists and the Legacy of MaritalProperty Reform, 19 MICH. J. GENDER & L. 259, 259-60 (2013) ("Did the divorce revolution
betray the interests of American women? While there has been considerable disagreement
about the impact of divorce reform on women's standard of living, many agree that judicial
practices involving the division of marital property and the allocation of alimony have
systematically disadvantaged women."). See generally WEITZMAN, supra note 30 (arguing that
divorce reform laws "have shaped radically different futures for divorced men on the one hand,
and for divorced women and their children on the other").
52 See, e.g., Jana B. Singer, Divorce Reform and Gender Justice, 67 N.C. L. REV. 1103, 1113
(1989) ("The point of this analysis is not to argue that the current divorce and alimony
standards adequately or equitably serve the needs of divorcing women and their children. They
unquestionably do not. But the attempt of Weitzman and others to blame the law's
inadequacies on the shift from a fault-based to a no-fault divorce regime misses the mark.
women were not 'better off under the old, fault-based divorce system. Indeed, in many ways
they fared considerably worse."); Kay, supra note 32, at 293 (admitting that no-fault divorce
regimes still required further improvements, but arguing that initial reforms successfully
"provide[d] a supportive context for substantive, rather than formal, equality"
for men and
women).
53 As such, most sophisticated empirical studies have relied on observational data that
contains few, if any, details about respondents' divorce case as well as variations in state law to
draw conclusions about the effects of divorce. See, e.g., Kate J. Stirling, Women Who Remain
Divorced: The Long-Term Economic Consequences, 70 SOC. SCI. Q. 549, 549-61 (1989);
Alessandra Voena, Yours, Mine, and Ours: Do Divorce Laws Affect the IntertemporalBehavior
of Married Couples?, 105 AM. ECON. REV. 2295 (2015).
54 For example, older divorce files are unlikely to be digitized and are more likely to be
missing or incomplete.
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have universally concluded that divorced women continue to be
financially worse off than divorced men under modern equitable
division regimes. 55
The question then arises as to why women, on average, remain
comparatively disadvantaged by divorce. With regard to this question,
multiple hypotheses have developed to explain the persistence of
women's unfavorable state. These hypotheses have universally focused
on current laws' failure to account for differences in the social
constructions (and social realities) of gender.56 The next Section briefly
discusses these hypotheses and their associated reform proposals.
B.

Accountingfor Gender Roles

Family law scholars largely agree that women's comparative
disadvantage after divorce-which has endured beyond the divorce
revolution-derives from divorce laws' inability to account for highly
pervasive differences in gender roles. Social and cultural constructions
of men's and women's proper priorities, household responsibilities,
strengths, and weaknesses are remarkably widespread, which have
translated into large gaps in men's and women's relative economic
power. 57 Although men's role in household caretaking has increased
See, e.g., Singer, supra note 52, at 1104 ("Virtually all of these studies have found that nofault divorce is financially devastating for women and the minor children in their
households."); Starnes, supra note 50, at 70 ("Startling inequities have resulted, as judges ignore
the realities of scant property and limited earning potential and adopt the legislative
assumption that homemakers need minimal, if any, maintenance."); see also Robert E.
McGraw, Gloria J. Sterin & Joseph M. Davis, A Case Study in Divorce Law Reform and Its
Aftermath, 20 J. FAM. L. 443, 487 (1982) ("Despite the best intentions of the drafters of Ohio's
marital termination law, all parties involved in marital termination suffer economically, but the
wife and children suffer most."); James B. McLindon, Separate But Unequal: The Economic
Disasterof Divorce for Women and Children, 21 FAM. L.Q. 351, 353 (1987) (finding that in New
Haven, Connecticut, divorce settlements received by women declined in the no-fault era).
56 Feminist theory traditionally distinguishes between sex (which is defined by biological
differences) and gender (which is defined by social or cultural constructions of gender norms).
55

See generally Judith Butler, GENDER TROUBLE: FEMINISM AND THE SUBVERSION OF IDENTITY 89 (2006).
57 Indeed, at least some of the raw gap in pay between men and women has been attributed
to the greater average share of time that women spend on home production. See, e.g., Claudia
Goldin, A Grand Gender Convergence: Its Last Chapter, 104 AM. EcON. REV. 1091, 1092 (2014)
(acknowledging that it "wouldn't hurt" for men to spend more time on home production in
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over time,58 women continue to bear the vast majority of such work.
Even now, only one-fifth of fathers serve as the primary caretakers of
their children,s9 and married women devote almost twice as much time
to childcare as do married men. 60 Beyond children, married women also
spend over 50% more time on housework than do married men. 61
Conversely, men continue to serve as the sole or primary breadwinner
in the majority of households.62
Conformity with traditional gender roles has remained remarkably
common for married, heterosexual couples, yet modern equitable
division laws-in the spirit of treating both spouses the same63-do not
directly address gender.64 In deciding what distribution is equitable,
these laws acknowledge that courts should consider both "the
contribution or dissipation of each party" to the "value" of the marital

order to close the gender gap); Francine D. Blau & Lawrence M. Kahn, The Gender Wage Gap:'
Extent, Trends, and Explanations, 55 J. ECON. LITERATURE 789, 846 (2017) ("As we have seen,
greater housework time is expected to negatively affect wages.").
58 See, e.g., Raising Kids and Running a Household: How Working Parents Share the Load,
PEW RES. CTR. (Nov. 4, 2015), http://www.pewsocialtrends.org/2015/11/O4/raising-kids -andrunning- a-household-how-working-parents-share-the-load
[https://perma.cc/J3ZE-8PHX];
Press Release, U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, Married Parents' Use of Time, 2003-06 (May 8,
2008),
http://www.bls.gov/news.release/pdf/atus2.pdf
[https://perma.cc/UUN7-3SXT]
(suggesting that fathers have increased their time devoted to childcare but remain far from
catching up to women).
59 LYNDA LAUGHLIN, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, P70-135, WHO'S MINDING THE KIDS? CHILD

CARE ARRANGEMENTS: SPRING 2011 21 (2013), https://www.census.gov/prod/2013pubs/p70135.pdf [https://perma.cc/QY74-UBRM].
60 See Joni Hersch, Home Production and Wages: Evidence from the American Time Use
Survey, 7 REV. ECON. HOUSEHOLD 159, 166 (2009) (reporting that married women spend an
average of 28.76 minutes on childcare every day, but men only spend an average of 15.67
minutes).
61 See id. (reporting that married women spend an average of 147.56 minutes on homerelated production every day, but men only spend an average of 93.60 minutes).
62 Although men's dominance as the primary or sole household breadwinner is declining,
much of this decline is due to the increasing share of unmarried mothers. See Sarah Jane Glynn,
BreadwinningMothers are Increasingly the U.S. Norm, CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS (Dec. 19, 2016,
11:59
AM),
https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/women/reports/2016/12/19/295203/
breadwinning-mothers-are-increasingly-the-u- s-norm [https://perma.cc/4ER8-57TH].
63 See Starnes, supra note 50, at 139 ("No-fault mistakenly assumes that the division of
property and little, if any, maintenance will afford equity to these women.").
64 See, e.g., UNIF. MARRIAGE & DIVORCE ACT § 307(a) (NAT'L CONFERENCE OF COMM'RS
ON UNIF. STATE LAWS 1973) (Alternative A) (serving as a model for future states' equitable
division laws).
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estate and "the contribution of a spouse as a homemaker."65 Beyond this
acknowledgment, however, equitable distribution laws provide little
guidance regarding how economic and non-economic contributions
should be balanced, nor do they directly address the power imbalance
that may result from one spouse holding most (or all) of the economic
control.66 It is precisely equitable division laws' failure to address the
economic power imbalance inherent in conformity with traditional
gender roles that has been faulted by most family law scholars.67
For example, many scholars have blamed equitable division laws'
failure to recognize that a spouse who takes a family-related career
break68 (most often the woman)69 permanently diminishes her longterm earnings trajectory. 70 Consequently, even if that spouse reenters
the workforce upon divorce, both her immediate and long-run rate of
compensation will be permanently lower than what she would have
achieved in the absence of a break.71 Beyond impairing the earnings
trajectory of the nonworking spouse, scholars have further faulted
equitable division laws' failure to recognize the permanent
72
improvement in the working spouse's long-term earnings trajectory.
According to economic theory, the nonworking spouse specializing in
the household allows the other spouse to specialize in working-that is,
to devote more time and energy to his job-which, in general, should

65
66

See id.
See id.

67 See Starnes, supra note 50, at 139 ("No-fault laws that authorize divorce at will place all
women who assume primary caretaking responsibilities in jeopardy.").
68 Note that this argument would hold for a spouse who decided to drop out of the labor
market completely or just to reduce labor market work in order to focus more on the home.
69 See Starnes, supra note 50, at 139 (discussing "the ordinary case of a wife whose role as
primary caretaker limits her career options and advancement, and thus reduces her postdivorce income").
70 See Marilyn Manser & Murray Brown, Marriage and Household Decision-Making: A
BargainingAnalysis, 21 INT'L ECON. REV. 31, 33-43 (1980) (modelling the conditions under
which individuals will choose to specialize in household roles within marriage); Marjorie B.
McElroy & Mary Jean Homey, Nash-BargainedHousehold Decisions: Toward a Generalizationof
the Theory of Demand, 22 INT'L ECON. REV. 333, 334-46 (1981) (same).
71 See Manser & Brown, supra note 70; McElroy & Homey, supra note 70.
72 For a discussion of the economic theory of household specialization, see generally GARY
S. BECKER, A TREATISE ON THE FAMILY (1981); Joni Hersch, Marriage, Household Production,
and Earnings, in MARRIAGE AND THE ECONOMY: THEORY AND EVIDENCE FROM ADVANCED
INDUSTRIAL SOCIETIES (Shoshana A. Grossbard-Shechtman ed., 2003).
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lead to greater success than he would have experienced in the absence of
specialization.73 Thus, without an explicit legal mechanism to
compensate working spouses for their permanently higher earnings
trajectory and nonworking spouses for their permanently lower
earnings trajectory, many scholars insist that equitable division laws will
continue to produce "an economic catastrophe for homemakers"74 and
to disadvantage women as a whole.75
Similar arguments have been made with respect to equitable
division laws' failure to counteract the norm of entitlement of
breadwinners to their earnings. Joan Williams has referred to this norm
as the "he who earns it, owns it" rule, observing that the rule "is so
strong that typically it is not overcome even by explicit statutory
language allowing courts to give wives entitlements that reflect their
domestic contributions."76 The broad discretion granted to trial courts
under equitable division laws permits this norm to pervade judicial
decisions, even if not acknowledged directly, by becoming the starting
point from which marital assets are divided.77 Williams has deemed this
starting point as "a holdover from coverture,"7s arguing that until such a
starting point is explicitly disavowed by the text of equitable division
laws, the nonworking spouse, and women generally, will continue to be.
relatively disadvantaged by divorce settlements.79

73 See BECKER, supra note 72, at 30-53 (discussing the economic theory of household
specialization); Hersch, supra note 72 (same); see also Williams, supra note 22, at 2252 ("[T]he
dominant family ecology illustrates that wives' labor is an integral part of the dynamic that
produced the husband's ideal-worker status.").

74 Starnes, supra note 50, at 139.
75 See id. ("No-fault mistakenly assumes that the division of property and little, if any,
maintenance will afford equity to these women. The broad discretion given trial courts
exacerbates this mistake, by inviting unrealistic and gender-biased views of a homemaker's
opportunities for rehabilitation and self-support.").
76 Williams, supra note 22, at 2252.
77 For a discussion of cases in which judges have started from the assumption of
breadwinner entitlement, see Ann Laquer Estin, Maintenance,Alimony, and the Rehabilitation
of Family Care,71 N.C. L. REv. 721, 748-54 (1993); Starnes, supra note 50, at 95-97.
78 Williams, supra note 22, at 2257.
79 See id. ("The key question is whether the law will acknowledge the continuing family
ecology or will ignore it. Traditionally, this question did not arise, because coverture arbitrarily
allocated ownership of family assets to the husband. Courts and legislatures need to ask
themselves whether to continue coverture's allocation or to change it.").
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A final argument related to equitable division laws' failure to
acknowledge traditional gender roles has been made with respect to
their influence on men's and women's behavior, instead of their
economic situation. Rather than focusing on the problems created by
conformity with traditional gender roles during marriage, these scholars
focus on the problems created for women by conformity with
traditional gender roles during divorce proceedings.80 Specifically,
scholars have noted that the shift towards negotiating a one-time
property division under equitable division regimes may expose the
weaknesses in how women are traditionally socialized: to prefer
82 Harnessing evidence from
cooperation 8' and to value caring.
behavioral law, economics, and psychology on gender and negotiation,
Tess Wilkinson-Ryan and Deborah Small have argued that the move
away from ongoing alimony under equitable division regimes has
disadvantaged women because
research indicates that women are more comfortable asking for
things than negotiating for things. Alimony involves transfers from
one party to another, whereas a financial settlement involves a

80 See, e.g., LENORE J. WEITZMAN, Gender Differences in Custody Bargainingin the United
States, in ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES OF DIVORCE: THE INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVE 395,
403-04 (Lenore Weitzman & Mavis Maclean eds., 1992) (finding that the way in which women
bargain for child custody disadvantages them); Penelope Eileen Bryan, "CollaborativeDivorce"
Meaningful Reform or Another Quick Fix?, 5 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y & L. 1001, 1002 (1999)
("Power disparities between husbands and wives, gender bias and incompetence among lawyers
and judges, and indeterminate substantive laws combine to produce inequitable and destructive
results."); Tess Wilkinson-Ryan & Deborah Small, Negotiating Divorce: Gender and the
Behavioral Economics of Divorce Bargaining, 26 LAW & INEQ.: J. THEORY & PRAC., 109, 111
(2008) ("[W]e expect that gender effects in divorce bargaining could vary importantly as a
result of the legal context.").
81 See, e.g., Trina Grillo, The Mediation Alternative: Progress Dangersfor Women, 100 YALE
L.J. 1545, 1603-04 (1991) (arguing that women's tendency to cooperate renders them
vulnerable in divorce mediation proceedings); Carol M. Rose, Women and Property: Gaining
and Losing Ground, 78 VA. L. REV. 421, 423-33 (1992) (arguing that women are socialized to
have a "taste for cooperation," which disadvantages them in divorce negotiations).
82 See, e.g., Penelope E. Bryan, Killing Us Softly: Divorce Mediation and the Politics of Power,
40 BUFF. L. REV. 441, 488 (1992) (arguing that women's care orientation disadvantages them in
divorce negotiations against their husbands); Nancy Ihman Meyers, Power (Im)Balance and the
Failure of Impartiality in Attorney-Mediated Divorce, 27 U. TOL. L. REV. 853, 880 (1996)
(arguing that divorce mediation exacerbates "the threat that women's care orientation already
poses for them in financial negotiations").
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division of resources between two parties; the former seems like
more of an ask situation and the latter more of a negotiate situation.83

Compounding this disadvantage for women is the fact that the equitable
division standard is inherently ambiguous, and psychology research
suggests that preexisting "gender differences are typically larger when
situations are ambiguous."84
Whether the culprit is gendered approaches to bargaining or
gendered approaches to household responsibilities, family law scholars
have largely blamed adherence to traditional gender roles for women's
continued disadvantage in divorce proceedings. Some broad reform
proposals exist to counter this persisting adherence: Vicki Schultz, for
example, has suggested shortening the work week to encourage women
to continue working (in spite of caretaking responsibilities) and men to
take a greater role in caretaking.ss But, in the absence of such private
sector reforms, most scholars have focused on reforming the text of
equitable division laws to acknowledge and, in some sense, to
compensate for any disadvantages created by conformity with
traditional gender roles. For example, Cynthia Starnes has argued that
equitable division laws should be reformed to match contemporary
partnership laws, in which the economically disadvantaged spouse
(usually the woman) receives a buyout of her interest in the enterprisethat is, the marriage.86 Williams has argued that the text of equitable
division laws must be amended to reflect that a breadwinner's earnings
are not owned by the breadwinner alone, but instead by the
breadwinner's entire family, in order to counter the norm of entitlement
to individual earnings.8 7 Wilkinson-Ryan and Small have suggested
83 Wilkinson-Ryan & Small, supra note 80, at 112.
84 Id. at 111-12.
85 Vicki Schultz, Feminism and Workplace Flexibility, 42 CoNN. L. REV. 1203, 1205-07

(2010).
86 Starnes, supra note 50, at 139 ("I advocate a new model of marriage based on
contemporary partnership law. Under this model, divorce occurs when a spouse dissociates
from the marriage before expiration of the term. Dissociation ends the relationship, but it does
not usually end the spouses' shared enterprise, which continues to generate income in the
hands of one or both spouses. The spouse who takes the smaller portion of the marital
enterprise-that is, the spouse who earns less-should receive a buyout. Most often, this buyout
rule will require a husband to pay maintenance to a wife who served as primary caretaker.").
87 Williams, supra note 22, at 2229-30 ("The question upon divorce is whether entitlements
within the family will follow entitlements within the market. Of course the husband owns his
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implementing default rules (such as a default rule favoring ongoing
alimony support) designed to counter any disadvantages created for
women who adhere to traditional female bargaining styles in divorce
proceedings within equitable division regimes.88
As this Section has demonstrated, family law scholars have largely
assumed that women's relative disadvantage in divorce negotiations is
the result of the inherently weak situation that traditional roles
engender. This prior scholarship has been highly sympathetic towards
women who embrace traditional gender roles-and are economically
penalized in divorce as a result-and has decried their plight as
normatively unfair. Yet, because the embrace of traditional roles may be
alternatively characterized as stemming from individual choice, this
prior scholarship opens the door for less sympathetic observers to
characterize women's relative disadvantage as perfectly fair and the
result of individual desert. Indeed, the media is full of commentators
who are quick to discredit all gender gaps as the result of women
89
making different economic choices than men.
Surprisingly absent from the family law scholarship is any
consideration that women's relative disadvantage in divorce stems from
something other than their making different economic choices. Despite
an increasingly robust literature on both implicit and explicit bias in
other areas of legal scholarship, family law scholars have not considered
the possibility that decision-makers, lawyers, and even litigants
themselves may be biased against women in divorce proceedings,
regardless of these women's economic choices. The next Section turns to
wage vis a vis his employer, but this does not determine whether he owns it vis a vis his
family.") (emphasis in original).
88 See Wilkinson-Ryan & Small, supra note 80, at 130-32 (arguing that "the default rule has
importance for its expressive content and for its effects on people's learning about the legal
system").
89 See, e.g., Karin Agness Lips, Don'tBuy Into the Gender Pay Gap Myth, FORBES (Apr. 12,
2016, 11:15 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/karinagness/2016/04/12/dont-buy-into-the(arguing that the
[https://perma.cc/J4UY-UY7H]
gender-pay-gap-myth/#d8081f025969
commonly used gender pay gap statistic "doesn't take into account a lot of choices that women
and men make-education, years of experience and hours worked-that influence earnings");
Christina Hoff Sommers, 6 Feminist Myths that Will Not Die, TIME (June 17, 2016, 3:20 PM),
[https://perma.cc/SV6E-36C4]
http://time.com/3222543/wage-pay-gap-myth-feminism
("American women are among the best informed and most self-determining human beings in
the world. To say that they are manipulated into their life choices by forces beyond their
control is divorced from reality and demeaning, to boot.").
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review the literature on bias from other areas of legal scholarship and to
reflect on its potential role in the division of marital assets.
C.

Accountingfor Gender Bias

The effect of bias on legal decision-makers has received a great deal
of attention by scholars, particularly during the past two decades.90 Bias
against historically-disadvantaged groups may be conscious or
unconscious, or as termed in the literature, explicit or implicit.91
Certainly, the explicit bias that has existed for centuries against African
Americans, women, and other disadvantaged groups is well
documented.92 Yet as modern society has evolved, and explicitly biased
views have become increasingly taboo, scholars have begun to question
the role that conscious bias presently plays in decision-making-even
though both legal and economic outcomes remain relatively worse for
historically disadvantaged groups.
Instead, many legal scholars have shifted their focus to the role of
unconscious bias in creating unequal outcomes. 93 Instead of assuming
90 See, e.g., Stephanie Bornstein, Reckless Discrimination, 105 CALIF. L. REV. 1055, 1056
(2017) (arguing that there is enough evidence of implicit bias to subject an employer to a
disparate treatment claim under Title VII when he or she relies on unchecked subjective
decision-making that leads to disproportionate employment outcomes by race or gender);
Jeffrey J. Rachlinski et al., Does Unconscious RacialBias Affect Trial Judges?, 84 NOTRE DAME L.
REV. 1195, 1204-08, 1232 (2009) (examining the effect of implicit racial bias on judges'
decisions); Samuel R. Sommers & Phoebe C. Ellsworth, White Juror Bias: An Investigation of
Prejudice Against Black Defendants in the American Courtroom, 7 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y & L.
201, 216-19 (2001) (examining the effect of race on jurors in race-salient criminal cases).
91 For a discussion of the robust legal literature on implicit bias, and an argument that
scholarly attention should shift back to explicit bias, see Jessica A. Clarke, Explicit Bias, 113
NW. U. L. REV. 505 (2018).
92 See, e.g., FELIPE FERNANDEZ-ARMESTO, OUR AMERICA: A HISPANIC HISTORY OF THE
UNITED STATES (2014) (documenting both the successes and the oppression of individuals of

Hispanic origin throughout American history); HENRY LOUIS GATES, JR., LIFE UPON THESE
SHORES: LOOKING AT AFRICAN AMERICAN HISTORY 1513-2008 (2011) (documenting the
oppression faced by African Americans throughout centuries of history); ALICE KESSLERHARRIS, OUT TO WORK: A HISTORY OF WAGE-EARNING WOMEN IN THE UNITED STATES (2003)

(documenting attitudes towards working women throughout American history).
93 See Anthony G. Greenwald & Linda Hamilton Krieger, Implicit Bias: Scientific
Foundations,94 CALIF. L. REV. 945, 948-52 (2006) (explaining the psychology behind implicit
bias); Christine Jolls & Cass R. Sunstein, The Law of Implicit Bias, 94 CALIF. L. REV. 969 (2006)
("Implicit bias poses a special challenge for antidiscrimination law because it suggests the
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that individuals have complete control over their decisions (whether
biased or not), implicit bias acknowledges that individuals do not always
maintain conscious control over the impressions they have with respect
to other people.94 Moreover, these impressions can, and often will, be
9 5 In psychology,
biased against historically-disadvantaged groups.
implicit bias is classically demonstrated through the Implicit
Association Test (IAT) in which subjects are asked to associate members
of a group with pleasant or unpleasant words, and their response times
are measured. In the race version of the IAT, respondents are typically
quicker to associate pleasant words with White faces than with Black
faces, thus demonstrating an implicit preference for Whites.96 Athough
97
much of the research focus has remained on race, implicit bias has also
been demonstrated with respect to ethnicity, age, disability, and
gender.98
Not all scholars are on board with implicit bias, and many continue
to argue that explicit bias remains the culprit for the persistence of
99
inequality among historically disadvantaged groups. Instead, these

possibility that people are treating others differently even when they are unaware that they are
doing so.").
94 See Greenwald & Krieger, supra note 93, at 947 ("In contrast, the science of implicit
cognition suggests that actors do not always have conscious, intentional control over the
processes of social perception, impression formation, and judgment that motivate their
actions.").
95 See Jolls & Sunstein, supra note 93, at 969 (noting that "most people have an implicit and
unconscious bias against members of traditionally disadvantaged groups").
96 See Greenwald & Krieger, supra note 93, at 952-53 (discussing the IAT test).
97 For an accessible summary of the implicit bias research, see MAHZARIN R. BANAJI &
ANTHONY G. GREENWALD, BLIND SPOT: HIDDEN BIASES OF GOOD PEOPLE (2013).

98 See Greenwald & Krieger, supra note 93, at 949 ("Dissociations are commonly observed
in attitudes toward stigmatized groups, including groups defined by race, age, ethnicity,
disability, and sexual orientation.").
99 See, e.g., THE NAT'L ACADS. OF SCIS., ENG'G, MED., PROACTIVE POLICING: EFFECTS ON
CRIME AND COMMUNITIES 7-22, 279 (2018) ("It is worth noting that one implicit measure of
social cognition, the Implicit Association Test (IAT), has sparked vigorous debate. Questions
have been raised about whether certain aspects of the measurement procedure (e.g., the
cognitive demands of the task or the differential salience of categories, like Black and White),
can create an illusion of biased behavior, racial animus, or the unconscious process
psychologists refer to as 'implicit bias' on the IAT, even when the participant does not harbor
negative views toward Black people."); Adam Hahn et al., Awareness of Implicit Attitudes, 143 J.
EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL.: GEN. 1369, 1369 (2014) (fimding experimentally that individuals may
have some awareness of so-called implicit biases); see also Clarke, supra note 91 (arguing that
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dissenting scholars argue that decision-makers are simply more
sophisticated about hiding, or not admitting to, their conscious bias.100
Still, even scholars who resist the idea of implicit bias agree that some
kind of bias persists throughout the legal system. 101 Despite the fact that
scholars may dispute the level of consciousness behind decision-maker
bias, they collectively acknowledge the persistence of such bias in
perpetuating disparate outcomes for disadvantaged groups. 102
Testing for the presence of bias (whether explicit or implicit) in
legal decision-making is difficult, if not impossible, using data collected
from reported case outcomes. Although disparities in case outcomes
experienced by historically disadvantaged litigants might be attributable
to bias, they might also be attributable to other unobservable differences
between disadvantaged and nondisadvantaged litigants, such as
disparities in the quality of representation. Thus, legal scholars have
increasingly relied on experimental vignette studies to examine the
influence of bias in case outcomes. In such tests, subjects are randomly
assigned to view a scenario and asked to make a decision regarding that
scenario; while the scenarios are otherwise similar, some scenarios
prime subjects with respect to a historically disadvantaged group.
Researchers then test whether inter-subject responses meaningfully
differ when the scenario involves a member of a historically
disadvantaged group.103 While that experimental vignette studies are

explicitly biased statements continue to abound, but courts have developed sophisticated ways
to ignore such statements).
100 Michael Selmi, The Paradox of Implicit Bias and a Pleafor a New Narrative,50 ARIZ. ST.
L.J. 193, 199 (2018) ("It is surely a mistake to conclude that all discrimination lacking a
confession arises from unconscious forces. This relates to how I believe the narrative should be
changed. When most legal scholars discuss implicit bias, what they generally mean is not that
the bias is unconscious but that much of discrimination occurs through stereotyping.").
101 See id. at 198-200 (arguing that most so-called unconscious biases are actually a form of
conscious stereotyping).
102 Compare id. at 245 (concluding that "[d]iscrimination remains a vibrant force in society"
but casting doubt on scholarly conclusions that implicit bias is to blame), with Jolls & Sunstein,
supra note 93, at 996 ("It is now clear that implicit bias is widespread, and it is increasingly
apparent that actual behavior is often affected by it, in violation of the principles that underlie
antidiscrimination law.").
103 For a discussion of the wide use of experimental vignette studies throughout empirical
scholarship, see Joni Hersch & Jennifer Bennett Shinall, Something to Talk About: Information
Exchange Under Employment Law, 165 U. PA. L. REv. 49, 72 (2016) ("Vignette studies combine
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quite effective at detecting bias in subjects, they are less effective at
distinguishing between implicit and explicit bias in subjects. 104
A concrete, and common, implementation of such a vignette study
involves scenarios in which subjects are asked to serve as jurors in a
criminal trial, determining guilt or innocence at the end. Although the
basic facts remain the same, in some scenarios, the defendant is a
member of a minority group, which subjects are made aware of either
directly or indirectly (typically through the defendant's name).
Researchers then compare rates of guilt determination in the minority
defendant scenarios versus the nonminority defendant scenarios. 105
Beyond the criminal context, 106 experimental vignette studies have
been used widely throughout legal scholarship in areas as diverse as civil
juror decision-making,107 judicial decision-making,108 contract law,109
survey questions with experimental methods; they are an accepted and frequently used
methodology in a number of disciplines, including social psychology, sociology, and law.").
104 Even if subjects are explicitly asked questions about their level of conscious bias, they
may not admit the full extent of their conscious bias. See Selmi, supra note 100, at 211
("[P]eople may not be more biased than they realize but... they are more biased than they are
willing to admit.").
105 For an example of such vignette studies, see Rachlinski et al., supra note 90 (examining
the effect of implicit racial bias on judges' decisions); Sommers & Ellsworth, supra note 90, at
216-17 (examining the effect of race on jurors in race-salient criminal cases).
106 See also Matthew R. Ginther et al., The Language of Mens Rea, 67 VAND. L. REV. 1327,
1349-58 (2014) (analyzing juror perceptions of mens rea culpability categories); Justin Sevier,
Testing Tribe's Triangle: Juries, Hearsay, and PsychologicalDistance, 103 GEO. L.J. 879, 903-22
(2015) (analyzing juror discernment of hearsay evidence in criminal cases); Francis X. Shen et
al., Sorting Guilty Minds, 86 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1306, 1326-44 (2011) (examining subjects' ability to
apply the legal definitions of mens rea in specific factual contexts).
107 See, e.g., Joni Hersch & Beverly Moran, Coitus and Consequences in the Legal System: An
Experimental Study, 68 SMU L. REV. 927, 935-44 (2015) (investigating whether and how
knowledge of a previous sexual relationship between legal adversaries influences subjects'
perceptions of the appropriate outcome in civil actions).
108 See, e.g., Rachlinski et al., supra note 90 (examining the effect of implicit racial bias on
judges' decisions); Andrew J. Wistrich, Jeffrey J. Rachlinski & Chris Guthrie, Heart Versus
Head: Do Judges Follow the Law or Follow Their Feelings?, 93 TEX. L. REV. 855, 876-98 (2015)
(testing whether judges act based on their emotional reactions to litigants); Jeffrey J. Rachlinski,
Andrew J. Wistrich & Chris Guthrie, Can Judges Make Reliable Numeric Judgments? Distorted
Damages and Skewed Sentences, 90 IND. L.J. 695, 710-35 (2015) (examining the effect of
anchoring on judges' award determinations).
109 See, e.g., Tess Wilkinson-Ryan & David A. Hoffman, Breach Is for Suckers, 63 VAND. L.
REV. 1003, 1022-32 (2010) (examining perceptions of contract breach); Tess Wilkinson-Ryan &
David A. Hoffman, The Common Sense of ContractFormation,67 STAN. L. REV. 1269, 1281-95
(2015) (examining subjects' intuitions about contract formation); Tess Wilkinson-Ryan &
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intellectual property law,1O and employment law.",1 Yet in spite of their
prevalence in other areas, vignette studies remain scarce within family
law scholarship. Three notable exceptions include a vignette study
testing willingness to report domestic violence,112 a vignette study
examining the generosity of marital property awards to women who
have taken a career break after having children,113 and a vignette study
testing the influence of fault in divorce property settlements.14 This
latter vignette study experiment, authored by Tess Wilkinson-Ryan and
Jonathan Baron, tested whether subjects were influenced by perceptions
of fault in the breakdown of a marriage, despite being told to ignore
fault.115 In a series of experiments, subjects were asked to evaluate the
reasonableness of proposals for division of marital property; even when
explicitly instructed that they were evaluating the proposals in a nofault, equitable division divorce regime, subjects wished to punish the
spouse perceived to be at fault for the divorce.116 Wilkinson-Ryan and
Baron thus concluded that no-fault laws were at odds with individuals'

David A. Hoffman, The Psychology of Contract Precautions, 80 U. CHI. L. REV. 395, 408-18
(2013) (examining parties' diverging approaches to self-protection before and after they
perceive that they have reached final agreement).
110 See, e.g., Shyamkrishna Balganesh et al., Judging Similarity, 100 IOWA L. REV. 267, 289
(2014) (demonstrating that other potential issues in a copyright claim significantly influence
judgment of the two works' similarity); Christopher Buccafusco et al., Experimental Tests ofIntellectual Property Laws' Creativity Thresholds, 92 TEX. L. REV. 1921, 1946-71 (2014)
(examining the use of a creativity threshold as an incentive in patent law).
111 See, e.g., Hersch & Shinall, supra note 103, at 80-86 (demonstrating that revealing the
reasons for a career break is better than hiding); Ian Ayres & Richard Luedeman, Tops,
Bottoms, and Versatiles: What Straight Views of Penetrative Preferences Could Mean for
Sexuality Claims Under Price Waterhouse, 123 YALE L.J. 714 (2013) (demonstrating that
knowledge of sexual preferences leads to stereotyping).
112 See Hadar Aviram & Annick Persinger, Perceiving and Reporting Domestic Violence
Incidents in Unconventional Settings: A Vignette Survey Study, 23 HASTINGS WOMEN'S L.J. 159,
185 (2012) (finding that "the tendency to report domestic violence to the police declines as the
incident diverges from the stereotypical male abuser/female victim scenario").
113 See Hersch & Shinall, supra note 10 (finding that individuals dividing a marital estate
"equitably" in a vignette study favored the husband, regardless of the wife's education level and
the level of marital assets).
114 See Tess Wilkinson-Ryan & Jonathan Baron, The Effect of Conflicting Moral and Legal
Rules on BargainingBehavior: The Case of No-Fault Divorce, 37 J. LEGAL STUD. 315, 334-37
(2008) (finding that even in a no-fault system, jurors are influenced by perceptions of fault).
115 Id. at 320-34.
116

Id.
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moral intuitions, which might contribute to the "impasse and costly
117
litigation" seen in many divorce cases.
Even though this handful of vignette study experiments related to
family law exist, absent from the literature is a vignette study on the role
of gender bias in family law. Indeed, absent from the literature is any
scholarship-experimental or otherwise-on the role of bias in family
law.118 This absence is particularly surprising since family law scholars
widely agree that divorce under no-fault, equitable division regimes
remains "financially devastating for women and the minor children in
their households."119 As discussed in the prior Section, scholars have
principally attributed these unequal gender outcomes to adherence to
traditional gender roles, and the law's failure to acknowledge or
compensate for their prevalence.120 Scholars have not considered
whether these unequal outcomes would persist even if men and women
made the same economic choices.
Moreover, there are several reasons to suspect that something other
than conformity with traditional gender roles might be responsible for
women's relatively poor outcomes after divorce. First, bias against
historically disadvantaged groups is increasingly recognized by scholars
as widespread, permeating throughout everyday life.121 Second, prior
studies have demonstrated that bias is most pronounced when decisionmakers enjoy broad, relatively unsupervised122 discretion under

117

Id. at 337.

118 Although the present study will focus on the role of gender bias, equally absent from the
family law literature is a study on the role of racial bias.
119 Singer, supra note 52, at 1104; see also McGraw, Sterin & Davis, supra note 55, at 487
("Despite the best intentions of the drafters of Ohio's marital termination law, all parties
involved in marital termination suffer economically, but the wife and children suffer most.");
McLindon, supra note 55 (finding that in New Haven, Connecticut, divorce settlements
received by women declined in the no-fault era).
120 See supra Section I.B.
121 See Bornstein, supra note 90, at 1056 ("Decades of scientific research have documented
how implicit bias and automatic stereotyping affect decision making in discriminatory ways.");
Jolls & Sunstein, supra note 93, at 970-71 ("[T]he real world is probably full of such cases of
'implicit,' or unconscious, bias. This is likely to be true not only with respect to race, but also
with respect to many other traits.").
122 Whether decided by a judge, a mediator, or another third party, the only method of
supervision in the division of marital property in a divorce is appeal.
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ambiguous standards. 123 Equitable division regimes fit this description
quite well; the charge to divide assets equitably, or fairly, contains no
inherent standards or guideposts.124 Indeed, one scholar has remarked
that "[t]he uncertainty of many family law standards is unique."125
Third, prior experimental vignette study evidence exists to suggest that
gender bias may negatively affect women when a sexual relationship has
previously existed between civil litigants. In this study, Joni Hersch and
Beverly Moran found that subjects' knowledge of a prior sexual
relationship between litigants after the demise of a short-term business
venture negatively affected the damages award to the female litigant. 126
Although the context of their experiment is outside the scope of family
law, the result suggests that similar biases-totally unrelated to
conformity with traditional gender roles-might be at work against
women in the divorce context. The next Part introduces an
experimental vignette study to test this hypothesis.
II.

THE EXPERIMENT

In this Part, I use an experimental vignette study to examine the
effects of traditional gender roles and gender bias in marital asset
division within equitable division regimes. After reviewing the
experimental subject pool in Section II.A, I describe both the structure
and the reasoning behind the vignette's design in Section II.B. Section
II.C presents the results.

123 See, e.g., Bornstein, supra note 90, at 1107 (proposing a legislative model "to prevent
[implicit] bias from impacting the way in which... discretion is applied" by decision-makers in
the workplace); Christopher A. Parsons et al., Strike Three: Discrimination,Incentives, and
Evaluation, 101 AM. ECON. REv. 1410, 1411 (2011) (demonstrating implicit racial and ethnic
bias in umpires' discretionary decision-making regarding strikes in ballparks with little
monitoring or supervision); Rachlinski et al., supra note 90, at 1230 (recommending that
"judges' discretionary determinations, such as bail-setting, sentencing, or child-custody
allocation.... be audited periodically to determine whether they exhibit patterns indicative of
implicit bias").
124 See Wilkinson-Ryan & Small, supra note 80, at 111 ("[Mlodern family laws are often
quite vague, using standards like 'equitable distribution' and 'best interest of the child."').
125 Gary Crippen, The Abundance of Family Law Appeals: Too Much of a Good Thing?, 26
FAM. L.Q. 85, 89 (1992).
126 Hersch & Moran, supra note 107, at 944.
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ExperimentalBackground

For decades, family law scholars have lamented the poor, and often
desperate, circumstances in which many women find themselves after a
divorce.127 Although these scholars have largely blamed the persistence
of traditional gender roles, which lead far more women than men to
take a family-related career break, for women's relative economic
disadvantage, they have not considered whether gender bias unrelated
to women's economic choices also plays a role. In this Part, I present an
experimental vignette study designed to test the role of gender bias
when determining the division of marital assets under an equitable
division regime.
As discussed in the prior Part, experimental vignette studies have
been frequently used in legal scholarship (albeit outside the family law
context) to examine the role of bias. Still, one might question whether
data from real-world divorce cases would be preferable to
experimentally generated data for the present study. But data from
actual divorce cases, as discussed in Section I.A, raise sample selection
bias concerns that extend beyond the typical concerns arising in data
from other types of litigation. Sample selection bias arises whenever the
sample of cases in a dataset is not representative of those types of cases
as a whole. 128 Data drawn from reported cases always give rise to such
concerns since many cases settle outside of court, and even cases that go
to trial may not be reported. Yet data drawn from reported divorce cases
are particularly concerning since the commonality of divorce has led
most jurisdictions to adopt minimal filing requirements, and judicial
opinions remain rare except in the most contentious matters.129
127 See supra Section

I.A.

128 Sample selection bias occurs whenever a sample is drawn nonrandomly from the

population intended to be studied. For a discussion of the biases that result from sample
selection bias, and an econometric correction for such bias, see James J. Heckman, Sample
Selection Bias as a Specification Error,47 ECONOMETRICA 153 (1979)
129 Particularly for uncontested divorces, a combination of simple filing requirements and
the proliferation of online services has made it easier than ever for individuals to file for divorce
pro se. For general descriptions of such do-it-yourself divorces, see Ronna L. DeLoe, How to Get
a Quick Divorce, LEGALZOOM, https://www.legalzoom.com/articles/how-to-get-a- quick-divorce
[https://perma.cc/Y2FR- UYMA]_(last visited Feb. 3, 2019); How to Get a Quick and Easy
[https://
https://www.wikihow.com/Get-a- Quick-and-Easy-Divorce
Divorce, WIKIHOW,
3,
2019).
Feb.
visited
(last
perma.cc/F3K6-BDTV]
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More critically, this study is principally concerned with gender
bias. Even if aware of their bias, individuals are unlikely to admit that
any kind of bias against a historically disadvantaged group motivated a
decision.130 Moreover, to the extent that bias is unconscious, then
individuals, by definition, would not be able to identify its role in their
discretionary decision-making.131 As a result, even the most
representative observational data are unlikely to yield much insight into
gender bias in divorce settlements.
Thus, in order to test whether gender bias plays a role in divorce
property settlements, I recruited 3,022 subjects, all voluntary workers
who had previously opted in to complete tasks on Amazon's Mechanical
Turk (mTurk). Workers eligible for participation had to be at least
eighteen years old, speak English, and reside in the United States. Upon
successful completion of the experimental study, each worker received
130 See Samuel R. Sommers & Michael I. Norton, Race-Based Judgments, Race-Neutral
Justifications: Experimental Examination of Peremptory Use and the Batson Challenge
Procedure, 31 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 261, 263 (2007) [hereinafter Sommers & Norton, Batson]
("[E]ven if [legal actors] consciously and strategically consider race ... they would be unlikely
to admit it. Such an admission would have immediate consequences .... More generally,
psychologists have noted that behavior is often influenced by the desire to appear
nonprejudiced and to avoid the social sanctions that can follow from the appearance of racial
bias."); see also Michael I. Norton et al., Color Blindness and InterracialInteraction:Playing the
PoliticalCorrectness Game, 17 PSYCHOL. SCI. 949, 951 (2006) (finding that individuals were less
likely to use race as a descriptor during a description task when paired with a black partner);
John F. Dovidio & Samuel L. Gaertner, Aversive Racism, 36 ADVANCES EXPERIMENTAL SOC.
PSYCHOL. 1, 3 (2004) (theorizing that "most well-educated and liberal whites in the United
States" wish to distance themselves from "blatant, 'old-fashioned' racism"); E. Ashby Plant &
Patricia G. Devine, Internal and External Motivation to Respond Without Prejudice, 75 J.
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 811, 818-23 (1998) (examining the relative influences of
internal and external motivations to act in an unbiased manner); Samuel R. Sommers &
Michael I. Norton, Lay Theories About White Racists: What Constitutes Racism (and What

Doesn't), 9 GROUP PROCESSES & INTERGROUP REL. 117, 121-30 (2006) (finding that respondents

wished to distance themselves from the classification of racist).
131 See Sommers & Norton, Batson, supra note 130, at 263 ("Many researchers have
demonstrated that people can offer compelling explanations for their behavior even when
unaware of the factors-such as race-that are actually influential."); see also Michael I. Norton
et al., Casuistry and Social Category Bias, 87 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 817 (2004)
(finding that "individuals engage in casuistry to mask biased decision making, by recruiting
more acceptable criteria to justify such decisions"); Eldar Shafir, Itamar Simonson & Amos
Tversky, Reason-Based Choice, 49 COGNITION 11, 14-32 (1993) (exploring the justifications
behind biased decision-making); Richard E. Nisbett & Timothy DeCamp Wilson, Telling More
than We Can Know: Verbal Reports on Mental Processes, 84 PSYCHOL. REV. 231, 231-32, 257
(1977) (documenting the limits on individuals' introspective abilities).
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132
$1.50 in exchange for approximately fifteen minutes of their time.
Workers' demographic characteristics are reviewed in Appendix Table 1;
in general, mTurk workers are somewhat younger, but more educated
and more likely to be employed than is the average person in the United
States.
Although the case has already been made for the appropriateness of
an experimental vignette study for the present inquiry on gender bias,
the chosen subject pool of mTurk workers might present an additional
source of concern. This study asks subjects to divide assets between
divorcing male and female spouses; this task is arguably not something
that most mTurk workers are accustomed to performing in everyday
life. While this concern is certainly valid, several factors serve to
ameliorate it. First, to the extent that judges divide marital assets
between divorcing spouses in real life, prior research has demonstrated
that judges may be susceptible to precisely the same biases as other
individuals33-including bias against historically disadvantaged
groups. 134 Second, perhaps more than any other area of law, it is
increasingly common for nonjudicial actors-and even non-legallytrained actors-to negotiate divorce settlements. Divorce mediators are
often trained as social workers or psychologists,135 not lawyers, which is

132 mTurk directed workers who signed up for the study to the survey instrument, which
was programmed using the survey software Qualtrics. The survey provided four distinct
scenarios involving employment and divorce. Here, I confine the discussion to the one scenario
of relevance to the present Article.
133 See, e.g., Chris Guthrie et al., Blinking on the Bench: How Judges Decide Cases, 93
CORNELL L. REV. 1, 27-29 (2007) (demonstrating that judges rely heavily on intuition when
making decisions); Rachlinski et al., supra note 108, at 710-35 (finding that judges are
susceptible to the anchoring effect); Wistrich, Rachlinski & Guthrie, supra note 108, at 876-97
(finding that judges have difficulty ignoring their emotional reactions to litigants).
See Rachlinski et al., supra note 90, at 1208-21 (finding that judges, without training,
harbor unconscious racial bias); see also Justin D. Levinson, Forgotten Racial Equality: Implicit
Bias, Decisionmaking, and Misremembering,57 DUKE L.J. 345, 398-405 (2007) (using empirical
evidence to argue that judges exhibit unconscious racial bias).
135 Mediation is a thriving industry for both social workers and psychologists. For articles
134

touting the benefits of a therapist mediator, see Hadassah Fidler, Should Therapists Mediate?,
Soc. WORK TODAY, http://www.socialworktoday.com/archive/exc_0216.shtml [https://perma.cc/
4LKW-6N2B] (last visited Feb. 3, 2019); Ilene Diamond, The Value of a Psychologist Mediator,
[https://
https://www.mediate.com/articles/diamondil.cfm
(Mar. 2011),
MEDIATE.COM
perma.cc/D7QT-ZSZQ]; Healthy Divorce: How To Make Your Split as Smooth as Possible, AM.
PSYCHOL. ASS'N, http://www.apa.org/helpcenterlhealthy-divorce.aspx [https://perma.cc/G8A8YFSB] (last visited Oct. 24, 2018).
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not wholly surprising given that the equitable division guidelines neither
require legal training to understand nor necessarily benefit from legal
training in application, given their vagueness. 136 To the extent that assets
are divided in divorce by nonjudicial actors, empirical evidence
indicates that they, too, are susceptible to the same biases inherent in
other individuals.137 In sum, to the extent that mTurk workers do not
divide marital assets for a living, they can still provide valuable insights
into the biases and intuitions that influence decision-makers who do
divide marital assets for a living.
Third, divorce is incredibly common, such that even individuals
without legal training are likely to have a personal experience with
divorce or, at the very least, be able to relate. Over 80% of individuals
will have been married at least once by the age of forty; of these
marriages, over one in five will end in divorce by the five-year
anniversary, and more than half will end in divorce by the twenty-year
anniversary.138 To the extent that workers in the mTurk subject pool
have been divorced in the past, or will be divorced in the future, the
results will indicate how individuals approach their own divorce
negotiations. If individuals harbor gender bias, endorse traditional
gender roles, or hold strong views regarding the entitlement of
breadwinners to their earnings, they might accordingly demand more or
less of the marital property. Fourth, and finally, mTurk workers have
been previously and widely used by legal scholars to gain insight into
precisely the types of questions of interest here139-that is, how
decision-makers make discretionary judgments-including questions
136 See, e.g., UNIF. MARRIAGE & DIVORCE ACT § 307 (NAT'L CONFERENCE OF COMM'RS ON
UNIF. STATE LAWS 1973).

137 In fact, nonjudicial decision-makers may render more biased discretionary decisions than
judicial decision-makers. In Inside the Arbitrator's Mind, the authors concluded after
comparing decision-making results by judges and arbitrators that "arbitrators often made
intuitive and impressionistic decisions rather than the fully rational and deliberative decisions
that might be normatively desirable." See Susan D. Franck et al., Inside the Arbitrator'sMind,
66 EMORY L.J. 1115, 1166 (2017).

138 See Key Statistics from the National Survey of Family Growth-D Listing, CTRS. FOR
DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION (2017), https://www.cdc.gov/nchs/nsfg/keystatistics/d.htm#

divorce [https://perma.cc/8WDA-AZ3S]; First Marriages in the United States: Data from the
2006-2010 National Survey of Family Growth, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION

(Mar.

22,

2012),

https://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/nhsr/nhsrO49.pdf

PU72].
139 See supra Section I.C.

[https://perma.cc/LT9J-

1888

CARDOZO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 40:1857

on family law.140 Bolstering the validity of using the mTurk worker
subject pool is research from the social sciences that has validated their
responses against the population more generally.141 With this subject
pool in mind, the next Section turns to discuss the details of the scenario
presented to these subjects.
B.

ExperimentalDesign

In this experiment, 3,022 subjects were randomly assigned to view
one of four variations about a couple, Tom and Sandra, divorcing after a
long-term marriage. Regardless of the assigned scenario, all subjects
viewed the following information:
Tom and Sandra began dating while attending the same college,
where both earned an accounting degree in 1997. They married
shortly after they graduated from college. Both worked as
accountants until the birth of their first child in 2000.
Subjects then viewed one of four experimental conditions,
indicated below by the letters A through D. In scenarios A and B, Tom
served as the primary breadwinner for the couple, with the spouse who
filed for divorce varying.
ScenariosA/B (Tom is the breadwinner):
After college, Tom began working for a large accounting firm, and
after steadily advancing in the firm now earns $400,000 per year.
After college, Sandra worked for a small accounting firm. Her salary
in 2000 was $30,000 per year.
After the couple had a child in 2000, they decided that they could live
comfortably on Tom's income. Sandra left her job in order to focus
on raising their child, and she has never returned to work. In 2013,
[A: Sandra/B: Tom] began putting on weight. [A: Sandra's/B: Tom's]

140 See Wilkinson-Ryan & Baron, supra note 114, at 320-23, 326-29, 333 (2008) (using a
vignette study to gauge decision-makers' reliance on perceptions of fault in no-fault divorce
cases).
141 See Ilyana Kuziemko et al., How Elastic Are Preferencesfor Redistribution?Evidence from
Randomized Survey Experiments, 105 AM. ECON. REV. 1478, 1480-81 (2015) (validating the
responses of mTurk workers against the responses of more established survey panels).
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weight gain is not related to an underlying health condition; [A:
she/B: he] is simply eating more and exercising less. [A: Sandra/B:
Tom] has gained 100 pounds over the past two years. After eighteen
years of marriage, [A: Tom/B: Sandra] feels that [A: he/B: she] is no
longer attracted to [A: Sandra/B: Tom], and [A: he/B: she] believes a
marriage without attraction is unsustainable. [A: Tom/B: Sandra]
files for divorce from [A: Sandra/B: Tom], citing irreconcilable
differences.
In scenarios C and D, Sandra served as the primary breadwinner for the
couple, again with the spouse who filed for divorce varying.
Scenarios C/D (Sandra is the breadwinner):
After college, Sandra began working for a large accounting firm, and
after steadily advancing in the firm now earns $400,000 per year.
After college, Tom worked for a small accounting firm. His salary in
2000 was $30,000 per year.
After the couple had a child in 2000, they decided that they could live
comfortably on Sandra's income. Tom left his job in order to focus
on raising their child, and he has never returned to work. In 2013, [C:
Sandra/D: Tom] began putting on weight. [C: Sandra's/D: Tom's]
weight gain is not related to an underlying health condition; [C:
she/D: he] is simply eating more and exercising less. [C: Sandra/D:
Tom] has gained 100 pounds over the past two years. After eighteen
years of marriage, [C: Tom/D: Sandra] feels that [C: he/D: she] is no
longer attracted to [C: Sandra/D: Tom], and [C: he/D: she] believes a
marriage without attraction is unsustainable. [C: Tom/D: Sandra]
files for divorce from [C: Sandra/D: Tom], citing irreconcilable
differences.
All four versions of the scenario then concluded with the following
prompt, intended to mimic the instructions to decision-makers in a nofault, equitable division jurisdiction:
You should assume that you have been authorized by Tom and
Sandra's attorneys to divide their assets, and Tom and Sandra have
agreed to abide by your decision.
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142
All assets were
The couple have net assets valued at $2 million.
accumulated during their marriage. The assets are liquid and are
easily divisible between Tom and Sandra. The only matter to decide
is the division of the net assets of $2 million. All financial and
custodial matters involving their child were settled amicably and are
separate from the division of marital assets. 143

The law in their state requires that you divide the $2 million fairly
between Tom and Sandra, but you need not divide the $2 million
equally between them.
What percent of the assets of $2 million willyou award to Sandra?
Subjects responded with an award to Sandra between 0 and 100

percent of the assets; the software was programmed to quantify this
percent in dollar terms for subjects in order to avoid any
misunderstandings. Subjects were then asked to rate the importance of
several motivations in choosing their award to Sandra on a five-point
Likert scale; these motivations included Tom's education, Sandra's
education, Tom's anticipated future earnings, Sandra's anticipated

future earnings, the entitlement of breadwinners to their earnings, the
value of staying home to raise children, the role of each party in keeping
the marriage together, and the role of each party in breaking the

The size of the marital estate was made intentionally large at $2 million to push subjects
away from automatically defaulting to a 50-50 split and to encourage subjects to consider each
spouse's perceived desert and need (to the extent such forces matter in the division of marital
assets). Another vignette study experiment on marital asset division suggests that increasing the
value of the marital estate above $2 million will not meaningfully impact subjects' division of
assets between spouses. See Hersch & Shinall, supra note 10, at 17. Future extensions should
consider whether decreasing the value of the marital estate below $2 million might impact
142

subjects' division of assets.
Subjects were explicitly told to ignore any concerns about child custody and child
support in order to simplify the analysis. To the extent that subjects still made assumptions
about which parent received primary custody or child support after divorce, future extensions
of this experiment should explore the effects of such assumptions on marital asset awards.
143
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marriage apart.144 At the conclusion of the experiment, subjects were
asked a series of demographic questions. 145
Before turning to the results, several points regarding the
experimental design merit further discussion. First, in all scenarios,
Tom and Sandra began their marriage with equivalent levels of
education and, presumably, equivalent levels of human capital. This
choice was designed to convey that the spouses began their marriage in
relative equipoise and to minimize any concern about illegitimate
motivations behind the marriage (for example, gold-digging).146 Of
course, as the marriage progressed, the spouses' opportunity costs of
staying in (or dropping out) of the labor market diverged, as signified by
the income gap at the birth of their first child, leading the spouse with
the lower opportunity cost to exit the labor market.
Second, in all scenarios, subjects were provided with a reason for
the breakdown of the marriage in order to make the scenario more
realistic and less ambiguous. Prior experimental literature suggests that
subjects might have exhibited ambiguity aversion if no reason other than
"irreconcilable differences" had been provided, which could have
confounded this experiment's ability to test for gender bias. 147 Still, great
care had to be taken in providing subjects with a reason for the marriage
breakdown since, as documented in the Wilkinson-Ryan and Baron
experiment discussed in Section I.C, decision-makers will punish the
party perceived to be at fault, even when explicitly instructed not to
punish in a no-fault regime.148 As a result, in all scenarios, the reason for
144 In the analysis that follows in Section II.C, subjects are considered to rate these
considerations as important if they selected either a 4 (important) or 5 (very important) on the

Likert scale.
145 Subjects reported their gender, race, ethnicity, age, educational attainment, employment
status, political party affiliation, religiosity, immigrant status, geographic location, height,
weight, and prior service on a jury.
146 Equivalent educational levels have tended to push subjects closer to a 50-50 split
in
similar experiments. See Hersch & Shinall, supra note 10, at 17 (finding that subjects awarded a
greater percentage of assets to wives who began the marriage with equivalent education to the
husband).
147 Ambiguity aversion describes the behavioral phenomenon in which individuals avoid
the
option perceived as more ambiguous. For a discussion of this phenomenon, which is widely
documented in the experimental law and economics literature, see Hersch & Shinall, supra note
103, at 65-70.
148 See Wilkinson-Ryan & Baron, supra note 114, at 334-37 (finding that even in a no-fault
system, jurors are influenced by perceptions of fault).
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the marriage breakdown was designed such that both parties were
arguably at fault. On one hand, subjects might attribute fault to the
spouse who gained a substantial amount of weight; on the other hand,
subjects might attribute fault to the spouse who actually filed for divorce
due to loss of attraction.
Third, the scenarios were designed to test whether subjects
demonstrated attachment to traditional gender roles and how subjects
translated any attachment into marital asset awards. Given the reliance
in prior scholarship on household roles as an explanation for unequal
outcomes along gender lines, the experiment most explicitly tests for
subject attachment by including two traditional scenarios (A and B, in
which the high-earning husband works, and the wife drops out of the
labor market to care for their children) and two nontraditional scenarios
(C and D, in which the high-earning wife works, and the husband drops
out of the labor market). As such, the results will allow for comparison
of the awards to breadwinners versus caretakers, to female breadwinners
versus male breadwinners, and to female caretakers versus male
caretakers. The experiment provides further opportunities to discern the
importance of bias towards breadwinners by directly asking subjects
about breadwinners' entitlement and the value of staying home to raise
children.
Fourth, and most importantly, the parallel nature of the scenarios
will allow for testing across subjects for the presence of gender bias
unrelated to the spouses' economic choices. If gender bias exists against
women, then the results should demonstrate that female breadwinners
are awarded less than male breadwinners and/or female caretakers are
awarded less than male caretakers. Because the scenarios are otherwise
identical, any significant difference in asset awards between men and
women must be motivated by gender-whether this motivation was
conscious or not. The next Section turns to explore subjects' asset
awards in detail.
C.

Results

A summary of the results from the experiment described in the
prior Section are described below in Table 1. Table 1 presents the
percent of marital assets awarded to the breadwinner, by scenario. From
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the results shown in Table 1, six principal findings emerge, which are
discussed in greater detail below.
Table 1. Mean Percentof MaritalAssets Awarded to the Breadwinner,by
Scenario
All Respondents

Male
Female
Respondents
Respondents
%of Assets
% of Assets
%ofAssets
Awarded to
Awarded to
Awarded to
Breadwinner
Breadwinner
Breadwinner
A
Tom
Tom
55.52
58.77
52,40
B
Sandra
Tom
64.07
66.23
61.86
C
ToM
Sandra
57.93
57,88
57.98
D
Sandra
Sandra
52.43
53.05
51.89
N
3,022
1466
1556
Notes: All scenario differences are statistically significant at the 5% level, with the exception of the difference between
scenarios A and C for male respondents and the difference between scenarios A and D for female respondents.
Statistically significant differences between scenarios are calculated based on a Bonferroni multiple comparison test.
Scenario

Spouse Who
Filed for Divorce

Spouse Who Is
Breadwinner

Table 2. Mean Percentof MaritalAssets Awarded, by Party Who Filedfor
Divorce
All Respondents
Male Respondents
Female Respondents
% of Assets Awarded to
57.50
59.12
55.96
Breadwinner
When Caretaker Files
61.01
62.20
59.86
When Breadwinner Files
5397
55.96
52.14
Difference
7.04*
6.24*
7.72*
% of Assets Awarded to Caretaker
42,50
40.88
44.04
When Breadwinner Files
46.03
44.04
47.86
When Caretaker Files
38.99
37.80
40.14
Difference
7.04*
6.24*
7.72*
% of Assets Awarded to Tom
52.32
53.79
50.92
When Sandra Files
55.83
56.97
54.75
When Tom Files
48.79
50.57
47.13
Difteence
7.04*
6.40*
7.62'
% ofAssets Awarded to Sandra
47.68
46.21
49.08
When Tom Files
5121
49.43
52.87
When Sandra Files
44.17
43,03
45.25
Difference
7,04*
6.40*
7.62'
N
3 22
-1,466
_556
Notes: An * denotes a statistically significant difference in share of assets awarded by filer at the 5% level.

Table 3. Mean Percentof MaritalAssets Awarded, by Sex of Breadwinner
All Respndents .
Mate Repondents __
Female Respondents
% of Assets Awarded to
57.50
59.12
55.96
Breadwinner
When Breadwinner is Male
59.81
62.57
57.07
When Breadwinner is Female
55.18
55.48
54.92
Difference
4.63*
7.09'
2.15'
% of Assets Awarded to Caretaker
42.50
40.88
44.04
When Caretaker is Male
44,82
44,52
45.08
When Caretaker is Female
40.19
37.43
42.93
Difference
4,63
7,09*
2.15"
N
3,022
1466
1,556
Notes: An * denotes a statistically significant difference in share of assets awarded by gender ofbreadwinner/earetaker
at the 5% level.
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Subjects Attribute Fault to the Filing Party

Although either spouse could have been reasonably blamed for the
downfall of Tom and Sandra's marriage, subjects consistently punished
the spouse who filed for divorce, not the spouse who gained weight. In
some ways, this result is surprising, given the great deal of research from
149
psychology, economics, and law on weight-based stigma. Previous
empirical evidence overwhelmingly suggests that overweight and obese
individuals are blamed for their weight gain and, as a result, assumed to
be "unmotivated, lethargic, unfit, lazy, inactive, sluggish, idle, weak,
sickly, [and] loaf."150 The relevant question for the purposes of this
experiment, however, is who is at fault for the divorce-not who is at
fault for the weight gain-and subjects consistently blamed the filing
party. Subjects' punishment of the party who filed for divorce suggests
that, consistent with Wilkinson-Ryan and Baron's results,151 subjects
took fault into account when dividing marital assets, in spite of the fact
that the scenario presented a no-fault divorce attributed to irreconcilable
differences.
Table 2 explores this punishment more thoroughly by breaking
down the percent awarded to the litigants by filing party. Regardless of
how the results are parsed, Table 2 demonstrates that subjects punished
the filing party by docking between 6 and 8 percentage points of the
marital asset award, with female subjects punishing the filing party more
149 See, e.g., Rebecca Puhl & Kelly D. Brownell, Bias, Discrimination,and Obesity, 9 OBESITY
RES. 788, 801 (2001) (concluding that "discrimination against obese individuals is very real. It
occurs in key areas affecting health and well-being."); Rebecca M. Puhl & Kelly D. Brownell,
Confronting and Coping with Weight Stigma: An Investigation of Overweight and Obese Adults,
14 OBESITY 1802, 1802-03 (2006) (finding that as BMI increased, so did reported instances of
weight stigma and weight discrimination); Tatiana Andreyeva et al., Changes in Perceived
Weight DiscriminationAmong Americans, 1995-1996 Through 2004-2006, 16 OBESITY 1129,
1131 (2008) (documenting that discrimination based on weight and height is just as common as

discrimination based on race or age).
150 Tanya Berry & John C. Spence, Automatic Activation of Exercise and Sedentary
Stereotypes, 80 RES. Q. EXERCISE & SPORT 633, 640 (2009); see also Mark V. Roehling, WeightBased Discriminationin Employment: Psychological and Legal Aspects, 52 PERSONNEL PSYCHOL.
of
969, 983-85 (1999) (concluding after a review of the psychology literature that stereotypes
and
sloppy,
competent,
less
obese individuals as lacking self-discipline, lazy, less conscientious,
more likely to have a personal problem were common).
151 See Wilkinson-Ryan & Baron, supra note 114, at 334-37 (finding that the instructions to
ignore fault when dividing marital assets were at odds with subjects' intuitions).
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than male subjects. Although male subjects punished the filer by 6.24 to
6.40 percentage points, female subjects punished the filer by 7.62 to 7.72
percentage points.152 To make these figures more concrete in dollar
terms, male subjects punished the filer by deducting $124,800 to
$128,000 of the marital asset award, while female subjects punished the
filer by deducting $152,400 to $154,400 of the marital asset award.153
Although subjects did not view the filing party favorably in their asset
division awards, as the next result highlights, they did view the
economically advantaged party favorably.
2.

Subjects Reward the Breadwinner

Looking back at Table 2, the analysis reveals that subjects
consistently awarded the breadwinner more than 50% of the assets.
Subjects' award pattern is consistent with Joan Williams's argument
regarding the strength and the pervasiveness of the "he who earns it,
owns it" rule.154 On average, subjects awarded the breadwinner 15
percentage points more of the marital assets than the caretaker, with
male subjects awarding more to the breadwinner (18.24 percentage
points) than female subjects (11.92 percentage points).155 In dollar
terms, this translates to subjects awarding an average of $300,000 more
of the marital assets to the breadwinner. 156
Subjects' substantially higher awards to the breadwinner are, on
their own, suggestive of their attachment to the norm of breadwinners'
entitlement to their earnings. Moreover, as additional analysis presented
152 Both differences are statistically significant at the 1% level.
153 These results hold in Appendix Table 2, which presents a regression of the share of assets
awarded to the breadwinner on an indicator variable equal to one if Sandra is the breadwinner,
an indicator variable equal to one if the breadwinner files for divorce, subjects' demographics,
and subjects' important motivations. These results suggest that male subjects penalize the
breadwinner for filing by 5.08 to 6.21 percentage points of the assets, while female subjects
penalize the breadwinner for filing by 6.62 to 7.77 percentage points of the assets. See infra
Appendix Table 2.
154 See Williams, supra note 22, at 2250-51 (arguing that "[t]he 'he who earns it' rule
provides the basic property law framework for the allocation of family wealth after divorce in
both community property and equitable distribution states").
155 All differences are statistically significant at the 1%level.
156 Male subjects awarded an average of $364,800 more to the breadwinner while female
subjects awarded an average of $238,400 more to the breadwinner.
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in Appendix Table 2 reveals, subjects actually revealed the influence of
this norm on their decision-making. Columns 7, 8,and 9 of Appendix
Table 2 regress the share of assets awarded to the breadwinner on
scenario characteristics, subjects' demographics, and subjects' important
motivations. As these regressions reveal, subjects who rated the
entitlement of breadwinners to their earnings as an important or very
important motivation awarded an average of $174,800 more to the
breadwinner.157 Although subjects consistently favored the breadwinner
in dividing assets, as the next Section will highlight, the gender of the
breadwinner also mattered to subjects.
3.

Subjects Reward the Male Breadwinner More than the Female
Breadwinner

Figure 1. Mean DollarAsset Award to Breadwinners,
by Gender ofRespondents
$1,300,000.00
... ...

$ 1,2 5 0 ,0 0 0 .00
$1,200,000.00

. ....

.

...

$1,150,000.00
T

$1,100,000.00

-______

$1,050,000.00
$1,000,000.00

.........

.....
Male Breadwinners
U Male Respondents

Female Breadwinners
a Female Respondents

On average, subjects awarded more than half of the assets to the
breadwinner, regardless of the breadwinner's gender. But returning to
Table 1, the results also make clear that Sandra's reward for being the
breadwinner (scenarios C and D) was less than Tom's award for being
the breadwinner (scenarios A and B). Table 3 explores this differential
further by examining the average award to the breadwinner by the

This number is calculated from the coefficient on breadwinner entitlement in Column 7
of Appendix Table 2 (8.74).
157
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breadwinner's gender. When Tom was the breadwinner, both male and
female subjects awarded him a greater share of the assets than when
Sandra was the breadwinner. On average, Tom received 59.81% of the
assets ($1,196,200), while Sandra received only 55.18% of the assets
($1,103,600)-a statistically significant difference of $92,600.158 These
substantial differences in dollar asset awards to breadwinners along
gender lines are displayed graphically above in Figure 1.
The above results also hold in the regression analysis presented in
Appendix Table 2, which indicate that Sandra received between $90,600
and $92,400 less than Tom for being the breadwinner, even after
controlling for differences in subjects' demographics and motivations. 159
These results are certainly suggestive of gender bias independent of
economic choices, although the results may also be consistent with the
familiarity of traditional gender roles. In the majority of two-parent,
heterosexual households, the male spouse, not the female spouse,
continues to serve as the primary breadwinner. 160 To the extent that the
scenarios in which Tom is the breadwinner reflect that norm, one
possible explanation of the gender-based discrepancy might be that
subjects found scenarios A and B more relatable. Nonetheless, when one
considers the flip side of these results, the role of gender bias becomes
clearer.
4.

Subjects Reward the Male Caretaker More than the Female
Caretaker

Although stay-at-home dads are increasing in number, they remain
relatively uncommon: in 2012, only 2 million dads were out of the labor
market and serving as the primary caretaker of their children, compared
with 10.4 million moms. 161 Indeed, dads who undertake significant
158 This difference is statistically significant at the 1% level.

159 These dollar figures are calculated from the lower- and upper-bound coefficients on the
"Sandra is the Breadwinner" indicator variable in Appendix Table 2 (4.53 and 4.62). See infra
Appendix Table 2.
160 The share of women who are the primary household breadwinner is rising, but it
still has
not overtaken men. See Glynn, supra note 62.
161 Compare Gretchen Livingston, Growing Number of Dads Home with the Kids, PEW RES.
CTR. (June 5, 2014), http://www.pewsocialtrends.org/2014/O6/O5/growing-number-of-dadshome-with-the-kids [https://perma.cc/YTG5-5XF8] (documenting 2 million stay-at-home
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childcare responsibilities-whether they stay at home or not-continue
to express dismay and stigmatization associated with this role.162 The
perceived stigmatization of stay-at-home dads might have led to a
prediction that Tom would be punished in scenarios C and D, when he
dropped out of the labor market to care for his children. But instead,
subjects rewarded Tom for being a stay-at-home parent, relative to
Sandra.
When Tom was the caretaker, both male and female subjects
awarded him a greater share of the marital assets than when Sandra was
the caretaker. As Table 3 reveals, Tom received an average of 44.82% of
the assets ($896,400) for being a stay-at-home dad, but Sandra received
only 40.19% of the assets ($803,800) for being a stay-at-home mom-a
difference of 4.63 percentage points ($92,600).163 These differences in
dollar asset awards to caretakers along gender lines are displayed
graphically below in Figure 2.

fathers in 2012), with D'Vera Cohn, Gretchen Livingston & Wendy Wang, After Decades of
Decline, a Rise in Stay-at-Home Mothers, PEW RES. CTR. (Apr. 8, 2014), http://www.pewsocial
[https://
trends.org/2014/04/08/after-decades-of-decline-a-rise-in-stay-at-home-mothers
perma.cc/EE3M-49WV] (documenting 10.4 million stay-at-home mothers in 2012).
162 See, e.g., Scott Coltrane et al., Fathers and the Flexibility Stigma, 69 J. SOC. ISSUES 279,
279-302 (2013) (finding that men who reduce or eliminate their working hours after becoming
a father face a flexibility penalty in the labor market); Laurie A. Rudman & Kris Mescher,
J.
PenalizingMen Who Request a Family Leave: Is Flexibility Sigma a Femininity Stigma?,2 69
0&%
SOC. ISSUES 322, 322-40 (2013), http://www.rci.rutgers.edu/-rudman/Rudman%
[https://perma.cc/Z9K6-A28L]
20Mescher%2OFemininity/o2OStigma-in%20press.pdf
a femininity stigma"). The
suffer
also
"may
leave
family
a
request
who
men
that
(concluding
has been deeply
responsibilities
childcare
on
take
who
men
against
stigmatization
of
problem
explored in the context of family leave. Men who are entitled to leave often choose not to take
it, or to take less than their full entitlement, because of this stigmatization. See Deloitte Survey:
Less than Half of People Surveyed Feel Their OrganizationHelps Men Feel Comfortable Taking
Parental Leave, DELOITTE (June 15, 2016, 8:30 AM), https://www.prnewswire.com/newsreleases/deloitte-survey-less-than-half-of- people-surveyed-feel-their-organization-helps-men[https://perma.cc/E6E8-F22A]
feel-comfortable-taking-parental-leave-300284822.html
half of the respondents fe[lt]
than
"fewer
which
in
survey
Deloitte
a
of
findings
(reporting the
comfortable taking parental
are
men
which
in
environment
an
foster[ed]
company
their
leave"); see also Claire Cain Miller, Paternity Leave: The Rewards and the Remaining Stigma,
N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 7, 2014), https://www.nytimes.com/2014/11/09/upshot/paternity-leave-therewards-and-the-remaining-stigma.html [https://perma.cc/JZ6M-GF3J] ("Even when there is a
policy on the books, unwritten workplace norms can discourage men from taking leave.").
163 This difference is statistically significant at the 1% level.
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Figure2. Mean DollarAsset Award to Caretakers,by
Gender of Respondents
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Not only do these results negate the popular perception that men are
stigmatized for dropping out of the labor market, but they suggest a
more general point, explored in the next Section.
5.

Subjects Favor the Male Spouse Over the Female Spouse

Figure 3. Mean DollarAsset Award to Tom and Sandra,
by Gender ofRespondents
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Whether Tom was the breadwinner or the caretaker, he received an
average payout that was relatively greater than Sandra's. This point
becomes particularly clear after reviewing the results in Table 2.
Averaged across all scenarios, subjects awarded Sandra less than half of
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the marital assets, but Tom more than half. The difference is both
substantial (4.64 percentage points, or $92,800) and statistically
significant at the 1% level. The difference in the average dollar award to
Tom and Sandra across all scenarios is further highlighted graphically in
Figure 3 above.
Taken together, these results indicate that subjects, on average,
exhibited gender bias against the female spouse when dividing marital
assets. Subjects awarded the female spouse less than they awarded an
identically situated male spouse. Moreover, this result persists even after
all scenario characteristics, subject demographics, and subject
motivations are taken into account within the Appendix Table 2
regression analysis. Regardless of Sandra's economic choices, the average
subject decided that Sandra deserved less than Tom at the end of their
marriage.
6.

Male Subjects Favor the Male Spouse More than Female Subjects

How much less Sandra deserved than Tom, as it appears from Table
2, depended on a subject's own gender. Although both male and female
subjects favored Tom over Sandra, male subjects' preferences were
stronger. Across all scenarios, male subjects' average award to Sandra
was 7.58 percentage points ($151,600) lower than their average award to
Tom, but female subjects' average award to Sandra was only 1.84
percentage points ($36,000) lower.164 In fact, even when Tom was the
spouse who filed for divorce, male subjects still awarded Sandra an
average of less than half of the marital assets. 165
This result that male subjects appear to harbor more gender bias
than do female subjects is not entirely surprising. Previous work on
implicit bias suggests that members of a majority group exhibit the
strongest implicit preferences towards themselves. On average, White
people hold the strongest implicit preferences for other White people.166
So, too, here do males hold the strongest preferences for other males.

164 Both differences are statistically significant at the 5 percent level.
165 See supra Table 2 (demonstrating that male subjects awarded Sandra only 49.43% of the

assets on average when Tom filed for divorce).
166 For an overview of prior implicit bias research, see PROJECT IMPLICIT, http://
www.projectimplicit.net [https://perma.cc/8NEU-HY9X] (last visited Feb. 3, 2019).
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Perhaps then what is more striking about the results is the fact that
female subjects harbor any negative gender bias towards Sandra. Because
men favor other men, one might naturally expect women to favor other
women. Yet this finding that a historically disadvantaged group exhibits
bias against itself (albeit less bias than is exhibited by outsiders to the
group) is also consistent with prior implicit bias research. Research on
African Americans, for example, reveals that they exhibit a small
preference for Whites over members of their own race.167 So too here do

female subjects exhibit a small preference for men over members of their
own gender.
Although the magnitude of the gender bias exhibited by males and
females may differ, the fact remains that both genders exhibit at least
some bias against women in the divorce setting. Although the subjects
analyzed in this experiment are not necessarily legally trained, they
nonetheless reveal a consistent tendency to punish female spouses
economically. Given the prior research exposing similarities in the biases
held by legal decision-makers and the biases held by the population
more generally,168 the results of this experiment raise serious concerns
regarding the legal systems impartiality towards women in the divorce
setting. These concerns are only heightened by the long history of
women's relative economic disadvantage following a divorce. 169 How the
legal system can begin to reverse this trend and to rid itself of gender
bias in the family law setting is considered in the next Part.
IlI.

EQUALIZING OUTCOMES: OVERCOMING BIAS AGAINST WOMEN

The experiment results presented in the prior Part demonstrate a
consistent and sizable bias against female spouses. Subjects awarded a
greater share of the marital estate to male breadwinners than to female
breadwinners who were otherwise identical. Similarly, subjects awarded

167 See Brian A. Nosek et al., Harvesting Implicit Group Attitudes and Beliefs from a
Demonstration Web Site, 6 GROUP DYNAMICS: THEORY, RES. & PRAC. 101, 105-06 (2002)
(finding that white Americans consistently favored other whites, but African-Americans
exhibited a more varying range of racial preferences, which averaged to a slight white
preference).
168 See supra Section I.C.
169 See supra Section I.A.

CARDOZO LAW REVIEW

1902

[Vol. 40:1857

a greater share of the marital estate to male caretakers than to female
caretakers. The bias exhibited by male subjects was more than three
times as large as the bias exhibited by female subjects;170 Still, female
subjects also penalized the female spouse, even though, in theory, they
should have been empathetic towards the female spouse's position.
Extrapolating these experimental findings to the larger issue-why
female spouses continue to be relatively disadvantaged after divorcethe experiment indicates that more than just breadwinner bias may
work against women. Judges and mediators may be unconsciously
biased towards awarding a greater share of the property to male spouses,
regardless of the spouses' breadwinning status. More disturbingly,
lawyers and litigants may not demand as great of a share for female
spouses as they demand for male spouses due to gender bias.171 Because
litigants are not, for the most part, repeat players in the divorce process,
the most promising interventions to counteract gender bias should be
directed towards judges, mediators, and lawyers. This Part reviews the
interventions that are most promising to reduce both decision-makers'
and representatives' gender bias, based on prior bias research.
A.

Inducing Empathy to CounteractBias

Perhaps one of the least costly interventions against bias involves
reforms designed to induce empathy within decision-makers towards
disadvantaged groups. Such reforms have been widely studied within
the criminal jury context; these studies typically find that jurors who are
able to empathize with the defendant are more lenient towards the
defendant.172 The key is to induce jurors to identify the defendant as
170

See supra Table 3.

Indeed, there is analogous evidence from the criminal context to cause concern regarding
lawyers' implicit biases, and how such biases may impact their advocacy for their clients. See
generally Theodore Eisenberg & Sheri Lynn Johnson, Implicit RacialAttitudes of Death Penalty
Lawyers, 53 DEPAUL L. REV. 1539 (2004) (concluding that criminal defense attorneys trying
capital punishment cases hold implicit biases against African-Americans).
172 See, e.g., Sheri Lynn Johnson et al., When Empathy Bites Back: Cautionary Tales from
Neuroscience for Capital Sentencing, 85 FORDHAM L. REV. 573, 591, 598 (2016) ("Social
psychologists have found that similar instructions [to imagine oneself in the other person's
situation] induce empathy for outgroup members, reduce prejudice and bias toward the outgroup, and improve attitudes toward the out-group as a whole."); see also Krystina A. Finlay &
Walter G. Stephan, Improving Intergroup Relations: The Effects of Empathy on Racial Attitudes,
171
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being like themselves; this feeling of similarity increases jurors' empathy
for the defendant and, in turn, reduces their urge to punish.173 The
simplest method of inducing such a feeling of similarity is to ask jurors
to imagine themselves in the position of the defendant before making
their decision, that instruction alone has been sufficient in the criminal
context to induce decision-makers to change-or, at least, to softentheir assessment of the defendant. 174 Most relevant to the present Article
is the research finding that such instructions induce greater empathy in
decision-makers when the defendant is a member of a historically
disadvantaged group. 175
Along these lines, a straightforward and inexpensive way to address
gender bias in the divorce setting might be to provide decision-makers
with such an empathy-inducing instruction. Within their equitable
division statutes, states could easily add language requiring decisionmakers to imagine themselves in the position of each divorcing spouse
before rendering a final decision on the assets. States might even
explicitly require decision-makers to reflect on whether their asset
division decision would change if the gender of each spouse were

30 J. APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 1720, 1720, 1727-28 (2000) ("[R]eading about discrimination
against African Americans or inducing empathy reduces in-group-out-group bias in attitudes
toward African American vs. Anglo Americans."); James D. Johnson et al., Rodney King and
0.1. Revisited: The Impact of Race and Defendant Empathy Induction on JudicialDecisions, 32 J_.
APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 1208, 1213-14 (2002) ("[P]revious research... has indicated that
empathetic induction has a significant impact on subsequent behavioral and judgmental
processes.").
173 The psychology literature emphasizes the need for identification with a particular person
or group in order to empathize with that person or group. See, e.g., John F. Dovidio et al.,
Empathy and Intergroup Relations, in PROSOCIAL MOTIVES, EMOTION, AND BEHAVIOR: THE
BETrER ANGELS OF OUR NATURE 393, 395 (Mario Mikulincer & Philip R. Shaver eds., 2010);
Karyn M. Plumm & Cheryl A. Terrance, Battered Women Who Kill: The Impact of Expert
Testimony and Empathy Induction in the Courtroom, 15 VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN 186, 191
(2009); Adam Waytz & Nicholas Epley, Social Connection Enables Dehumanization, 48 J.
EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 70, 71 (2012).
174 See sources cited supra note 172.
175 The majority of studies focus on empathy- induction instructions when a defendant is a
member of a different racial group. See, e.g., Finlay & Stephan, supra note 172 ("[R]eading
about discrimination against African Americans or inducing empathy reduces in-group-outgroup bias in attitudes toward African American vs. Anglo Americans."); Paola Sessa et al.,
Taking One's Time in Feeling Other-Race Pain: An Event-Related PotentialInvestigation on the
Time-Course of Cross-Racial Empathy, 9 SOC. COGNITIVE & AFFECTIVE NEUROSCIENCE 454,
454-55 (2014) (reviewing the literature finding a link between empathy and racial bias).
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reversed. Such instructions might be sufficient to prompt decisionmakers to reflect on any gender biases they harbor-whether explicit or
implicit-and give them a chance to correct for such biases.
In the absence of statutory reform, empathy training courses might
also make some progress in counteracting gender bias within the
divorce setting. Family law judges, mediators, and lawyers regularly
undergo retraining as part of their continuing education requirements;
training courses designed to help them identify their biases-and to use
techniques such as empathy induction to overcome identified biasesmight prove particularly useful. At least one study has demonstrated
that judges who are made aware of their own racial bias can
subsequently and appropriately correct for it,176 suggesting that a good
training session may go a long way.
Such a session would need to begin by helping trainees self-identify
their biases since, as several scholars have noted, both judges177 and
individuals more generallyl78 tend "to assume that their judgments are
uncontaminated."179 One self-identification method readily available to
trainers 8 that has been suggested by prior scholars has been to
administer the IAT test-which, although designed to reveal implicit
bias, would presumably reveal explicit bias as well.18, For judges,
mediators, and lawyers concentrating on family law, the variant of the
IAT used would assist trainees in identifying their gender-related biases.
After revealing the test results, trainings could then proceed to educate
trainees about the prevalence of gender bias generally as well as the long
history of women's economic disadvantage following divorce. Trainees

176 See Rachlinski et al., supra note 90, at 1229-30 (finding that judges appropriately
corrected for previously identified biases, although admitting that prior studies had found
evidence of overcorrection and undercorrection in other subject pools).
177 See Chris Guthrie et al., Inside the JudicialMind, 86 CORNELL L. REV. 777, 814-15 (2001)

(finding that judges exhibit egocentric biases).
178 See Timothy D. Wilson et al., Mental Contamination and the Debiasing Problem, in
HEURISTICS

AND

BIASES: THE

PSYCHOLOGY OF INTUITIVE

JUDGMENT

185,

190 (Thomas

Gilovich et al. eds., 2002) ("The reason for people's faith in their own judgements can be traced
to both motivational and cognitive factors.").
179 Id.

180 A variety of free IAT tests are available online, most notably through Project Implicit at

Harvard. See PROJECT IMPLICIT, https://implicit.harvarc~edu/implicit/takeatest.htrnl [https://
perma.cc/64DK-S8U6] (last visited Feb. 3, 2019).
181 See Rachlinski et al., supra note 90, at 1227-28 (discussing and utilizing the IAT test).
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would then be encouraged to use self-reflection and empathy-induction
techniques going forward in the practice of family law. Judges and
mediators might be encouraged to question whether they would make
the same asset division decision if the genders of the spouses were
reversed; lawyers might be encouraged to question whether they would
represent their client in the same way if the client's gender was reversed.
Whether through training or through statutory instructions,
empathy-induction techniques seem a relatively costless way to
counteract gender bias in marital asset division. Still, skeptics may
rightly worry whether decision-makers will pay attention to new
statutory directives, and whether continuing education trainings can
have any meaningful and lasting effect on judges', mediators', and
lawyers' everyday practice. For these reasons, additional interventions,
discussed in the next two Sections, are likely warranted.
B.

Auditingfor Bias

Empathy-induction directives will have little effect if judges,
mediators, and lawyers ignore them. Particularly for judges and
mediators who are responsible for dividing marital assets, introducing a
secondary level of review may be one way to identify (and intervene
against) the most biased decision-makers. One idea might be to require
an automatic second review for bias by an outsider to the case in every
marital property division decision-perhaps by another judge or
another mediator-almost like an automatic appellate review.1s2 Yet
given the sheer volume of divorce cases, increased second-level review of
individual case outcomes would be quite costly to state judiciaries, both
from a monetary and a time perspective. Moreover, since many
divorcing spouses want to end the process as quickly and as cheaply as
possible, implementing a mandatory, second review could actually
punish litigants more than protect them.
182 Increasing appellate review, whether through introducing an automatic
second review or
by heightening appellate review standards (from clear error or arbitrary and capricious to de
novo), has been suggested by previous scholars as a way to combat implicit bias. See, e.g.,
Michel E. Solimine, Congress, Ex Parte Young, and the Fate of the Three-Judge District Court,
70 U. PITT. L. REV. 101, 128-134 (2008) (arguing for greater use of three-judge panels, even in
trial court decisions); see also Rachlinski et al., supra note 90, at 1231-32 (discussing possible
appellate review interventions against implicit bias).
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Arguably, instead of reviewing every case individually, a more
efficient way to identify biased decision-makers would be to evaluate
systematically a multi-case sample of their decisions. Judiciaries, for
example, might implement an auditing process, whereby asset-split by
gender is regularly evaluated across a random sample of a judge's recent
cases. 183 When using a multi-case sample, auditors would not need to get
lost in the details of each individual case; instead, their goal would be to
determine whether a judge (or other decision-maker) consistently
awarded a substantially greater share of marital assets to male spouses.
Decision-makers identified as disproportionately favorable to men
might then be targeted for further interventions and training.
Auditing interventions are good at identifying biased decisionmakers ex post, and auditing can be a useful step towards improving
these decision-makers' future decisions. Yet auditing, while a cheaper
intervention than automatic appellate review, is still costly for
jurisdictions in terms of time and money. Furthermore, auditing ex post
may be of little comfort to wives who have been awarded a relatively low
share of marital assets as the result of a biased decision. Consequently,
the final-and most promising-intervention, described in the next
Section, is aimed at forcing decision-makers to confront any possible
gender bias at the time of decision and to justify disproportionate awards
to men in a much less expensive manner.
C.

Introducinga Presumption of Equality

The final intervention against gender bias is one that is already in
place within thirteen equitable division states184-introducing a
presumption of equal asset division. Currently, decision-makers in the
thirty-four other equitable division jurisdictions have no numerical

183 Introducing an auditing process to identify the most biased decision-makers has been
previously suggested by other scholars. See, e.g., Jean E. Dubofsky, JudicialPerformance Review:
A Balance Between Judicial Independence and Public Accountability, 34 FORDHAM URB. L.J.
315, 320-22 (2007) (arguing for increased review on the multi-case level, rather than
scrutinized review of individual cases); Rachlinski et al., supra note 90, at 1230-31 (suggesting
auditing as a way to "enhance the accountability of judicial decisionmaking").
184 See Hersch & Shinall, supra note 10, App. Table 1 (reviewing marital property division
laws in all fifty states).
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starting point, or anchor, 185 when dividing assets; they must rely instead
on a rather ambiguous set of criteria186 and a (potentially biased) notion
of fairness. Such "indeterminate rules" as Tess Wilkinson-Ryan and
Deborah Small have pointed out, may
leave the parties less constrained in their private negotiations and
thus better able to maximize their joint welfare. But if the empirical
data suggests that the parties are not maximizing joint welfare or that
there is a systematic imbalance between them (and it does), we might
question the value of indeterminate rules and their utility for the
normative [divorce] model.187
As a result, modifying equitable division laws to make them more
determinate and definite could help close the economic gap between
men and women after divorce.
By establishing a starting point of 50-50 division, most individuals
will automatically anchor around that number, which should, by itself,
ameliorate unconscious tendencies to award a greater share of assets to
men.188 Moreover, the presumption of equality could be further
strengthened by requiring decision-makers to justify in writing all
property division awards that deviate from the 50-50 default. Such a
requirement would force decision-makers to think twice before favoring
one spouse over another and to articulate carefully their reasoning
whenever they decide to deviate from equal division. Moreover, the cost
of this intervention is relatively low; it costs only some extra time from

185 Anchoring describes the attachment to a suggested numerical reference point.
Amos
Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases, 185 SCI.
1124, 1128 (1974) (discussing the anchoring effect); see also Rachlinski, Wistrich, & Guthrie,
supra note 108, at 710-35 (finding that judges are susceptible to the anchoring effect).
186 See, e.g., UNIF. MARRIAGE & DIVORCE ACT § 307 (NAT'L CONFERENCE OF COMM'RS ON

UNIF. STATE LAWS 1973).
187 Wilkinson-Ryan & Small, supra note 80, at 132; see also James R. Ratner, Distribution
of
Marital Assets in Community Property Jurisdictions:Equitable Doesn't Equal Equal, 72 LA. L.
REV. 21, 24 (2011) ("The use of a broad, standardless version of 'equitable' division of the
community assets and liabilities is unfortunate.").
188 See Ratner, supra note 187, at 25 (arguing for equal, instead of equitable, division because
"departures [from equal division] do more damage than good").
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decision-makers-time that will be well spent if it forces decisionmakers to confront their gender bias.189
In sum, the equality presumption arguably holds the most potential
for counteracting gender bias in divorce settlements, while remaining
complementary to the previously discussed empathy-induction and
auditing interventions. Whether implemented alone or in conjunction
with other measures, an equality presumption with a written
justification requirement may serve as an important nudge for decisionmakers to correct any biases they harbor towards female spouses.
CONCLUSION

From the time of their advent almost fifty years ago, equitable
division laws have disappointed family law scholars. Although these
laws were intended to assist women in gaining an economic foothold
after divorce, since their passage, women have continued to exit
marriages in a state of relative disadvantage when compared to men. To
close this economic gap, family law scholars have exclusively focused on
legal interventions designed to compensate for the fact that traditional
gender roles may render women, as a group, less economically powerful
than men.
This Article suggests that the persistence of men as the primary
breadwinner within married, heterosexual couples is not the only force
to blame for women's poor outcomes after divorce. Using evidence from
an experimental vignette study, the Article demonstrates that decisionmakers award a smaller percentage of assets to women, relative to
similarly situated men, after the dissolution of a two-parent,
heterosexual marital relationship. This finding holds true whether the
wife occupies the traditional role of caretaker, or the nontraditional role
of breadwinner. Although a wife's economic contribution to a twoparent, heterosexual household impacts her asset award, so, too, does
One additional concern that may arise with respect to the equality presumption is that it
may harm female breadwinners-who, according to the results of this experiment, can already
expect to receive more than 50 percent of marital assets. But recall that males continue to
outnumber females as the primary earners in two-parent, heterosexual households in the
United States. See sources cited supra notes 62 and 160 and accompanying text. Consequently,
this intervention will still help women as a whole, even if this help comes at the expense of the
189

relatively few female breadwinners.
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her gender. Future extensions of this work should examine to what
extent these conclusions hold for two-parent, homosexual households.
Family law scholars, by and large, have assumed a position of
advocacy when it comes to women and marital asset division. Because
women as a whole continue to be economically disadvantaged by
divorce-and because this disadvantage shows no sign of improvingscholars have typically taken the normative position that women need
additional help in their divorces: help to overcome decision-makers'
bias towards breadwinners, help to overcome women's focus on
caretaking at the expense of their careers, and help to overcome
women's adherence to other traditionally female-dominated roles.190 In
advocating for the need to improve women's economic position after
divorce, scholars have inadvertently portrayed women's current state of
economic disempowerment as the result of women's own choices.
Yet as this Article suggests, women's own choices are not solely to
blame for women's economic disempowerment after divorce. Family
law scholars should no longer ignore the role of bias against womenbias that has nothing to do with breadwinning, caretaking, or
conformity with gender expectations. If scholars and advocates truly
wish to improve the economic outcomes of female spouses after divorce,
they must change their narrative to reflect that not all gender bias stems
from men and women making different choices.

190 See supra Section I.B.
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APPENDIX

Appendix Table 1. Comparison of mTurk Subjects' Demographics to the
2015 U.S. Census Demographics
uphic Characteristic
Percent Female
Median Age
Married
ffisparicALatino
White
Black/African-American
Asian
Bachelor's Degree or Higher
Employment Rate
Median Household Income

mTvrk Workers
51 5
32.0
38.5
73
80.6
7.5
5.3
54.1
81.2
S52.500

U.S. Census Population
50.8
42.4
48.8
17.4
77.4
132
5.4
28.8
59.5
$53 545

Notes: Bachelor's degree rat is repMontd for individuals who are o-er the age of24, Empliyrnent nile is calcuale across the
entire sarplc (including individuals who are not actisely participating in lhe labor market). Race deiographi.s iicalculated
using individuals who reported a single race.
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Appendix Table 2. Regression Analysis of Percentof Assets Awarded to

Breadwinner, by Scenario Characteristics,Subject Demographics,and
Subject Motivations
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